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1. Introduction 
Vanance reduction techmques have made feasible the use of the Monte Carlo 
method to sImulate even large state space governing Markov processes such as 
those encountered here in modeling systems for reliabilIty and/or availabilIty 
evaluation. The present version of our Monte Carlo program for computing 
system unreliability effectively uses two variance reduction te~hniques: forced 
transltlons and faIlure biasing [1,2]. The structure of the program dIffers from 
earlier versions as it was written to be consistent with the HARP code which 
employs behavioral decomposItion [3,4,5]. ThIS enables us to impartially 
demonstrate the capability of our Markov Monte Carlo method versus the Runge-
Kutta method used in the HARP code to solve the Markov cham m the relIabIlIty 
analysis. The HARP provides several models for system fault/error-handlIng 
(called FEHM's or coverage models) whIch are accessible by our program (see 
AppendIX A) In addItion to these coverage models we separately incorporate into 
our program the handling of common mode failures and take into account their 
mfluence on the overall system unreliability. A listIng of our program appears In 
Appendix C. In Appendix D IS a copy of a previous paper [2] which provides more 
or less a summary of our work prior to the inclusion of common mode failures 
mto the relIability simulatIon. What appears in Section 1.1 is a brief account of 
our work including the implementation scheme of our most general common 
mode faIlure model. The equations which appear here are more program-specific 
and mdicatIve of the coding implications involved with programming the more 
general equatlons which appear in the paper of Appendix D. 
1.1. Transition Rates and Probabilities Including Common Mode Failures 
Each step in the simulation of a Monte Carlo tnal requires the computation of the 
total transition rate "(k(t) out of the present system state k. This rate is given 
explicitly by 
(1 1) 
where 
Mk 
"(ek(t) = L CJk~k(t) 
)=1 
and 
Mk 
'Ynk(t) = L N)kA,1c(t) 
)=1 
Mk 
'Ysk(t) = L S)kA,1c(t) 
)=1 
M 
'Yem = 1 VJ )=1 
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For computing 'Yek' 'Ynk' and 'Ysk' the summatlOns include only the Mk number of 
operational components in state k wIth respective component failure rates A)k(t). 
(We clarify that A)k(t) represents the failure rate of component J at simulation state 
k and time t in the Monte Carlo trial. It represents a more general transItion rate 
in Appendix D.) The coefficients C)k! N)k! S)k! and R)k are computed using Harp 
fault/error-handling models as explained in Appendix A. RjI< does not appear In 
Eq (1.1) Since this fraction of the faIlure rate does not contribute to the transition 
rate "out" of state k The rate 'Yem is the contribution of common mode faIlures, 
WIth event rates v)' to the total transition rate out of state k. Since we consider the 
event rates v) to be independent of hme, 'Yem will have the same value for all states 
k For tIme-increasmg failure rates we must also compute 'Yk(T) where T is the 
simulation mission time corresponding to the design life of the system. This 
state-dependent, time-independent rate is greater than the actual transition rate 
'Yk (t) and must be used for sampling the distribution function of times to the next 
state transitIon in the Monte Carlo trial [6]. 
To determine the next system state (k+1) in the simulation of the Monte Carlo 
trial, we must compute the following condItIonal probabilitIes 
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and 
Pst = 1- Pf (1.2) 
where 
(1.3) 
If only constant component failure rates are used, the self-transition probability Pst 
wIll be zero since 'Yk(T)='Yk(t). Otherwise for 'Yk(T»'Yk(t), the probability for self-
transItion inherently corrects for the biasing introduced by needing to use 'Yk(T) to 
sample the time of the next state transition. If 'Yk(T) is much larger that 'Yk(t), then 
Pst wIll be large In thls case, for the purpose of variance reduction, we failure bIas 
the probabilitIes m Eq (1.2) m order to increase the total failure transItIon 
probabillty Pf m Eq (1.3) The bIased probabIlitIes are gtven by 
BPe = Pe (X/Pf) 
BPn = Pn (X/Pi) 
BPs = Ps (X/Pf) 
BPcm = Pem (X/Pi) 
and 
BPst = 1- X (1.4) 
where the failure biasmg factor X is input by the user and has a typical value of 0.5. 
We note that biasing is only used when Pf < X, and otherwise the probabilities in 
Eq (1.2) are used 
The type of transItIon (component failure, near coincIdent fault, single pomt 
faIlure, common mode faIlure, or self-transition) IS determined by completely 
dIvldmg the umt interval into dIsjoint subintervals of lengths proportional to the 
probabIlIties m Eq. (1.2) or Eq. (1.4), and then draWIng a uniform random number 
between 0 and 1. The subinterval in which the random number lies corresponds 
to the type of transition For self-transitions there is no change in the system state 
and the Monte Carlo trial continues, while single point failure 1nd r.ear 
comcIdent fault transltIons are system failure states whIch termmate the Monte 
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Carlo trIal For a component failure transition, the failed component is found by 
dlndmg the umt mterval mto subintervals proportIonal to the (operatlonal) 
component failure rates AJk(t) and agam using a random value to pick an mterval 
correspondmg to the failed component. It is then determined whether the new 
system state defmed by the failed component is a system fallure state or not Tlus 
IS discused m SectIon 2.2. We next discuss in detail how we determine the next 
system state for a common mode failure transition. 
If the type of transitIon corresponds to common mode failure, we fIrst determme 
the event i which caused the failure by dividmg the umt interval into lengths 
proportIonal to the varIOUS event rates VI and then using a random value ~ to pick 
the event ExplICItly, event i may be chosen by satisfymg the condItion 
(VI + .. + VI-I) ~ ~ < (VI + ... + VI) 1cm 1cm 
oyer 1=1, .. , M WIth Vo defmed to be zero. 
For each event i there is defined a next state probability vector denoted 
The 11 next state probabIlIties for event i are normalIzed to sum to one. 
Correspondmg to each PJ is an n-tuplet K) defining the number of components 
from each group which fail. (Component groups are discussed m Section 2.1.) The 
next state (k+l) is defined by failing the number of components in K J 
corresponding to the probability PJ picked using a random value per the usual 
interval sampling method. In the most general case the system modeler must 
speCIfy II, PV I' and the n-tuplets K) (J=l, ... , 11 ), as well as the rates VI' for each 
common mode failure event i Other less general options are also available as 
dIscussed in SectIon 2 4. 
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2. System Modeling for Markov Monte Carlo Evaluation 
ThIS chapter descnbes in general the system modeling options and the reqUlred 
mput to the Monte Carlo program. Upon first executing the Monte Carlo code, the 
user IS presented WIth three options: 
1) Input a new system model; 
2) EdIt the old input file; 
3) Use the mput £lIe as IS. 
The program always reads the input from a file named IN'PMC.DAT. Caution 
should be exercIsed in selecting optIon 1) or 2) as these options will overwrite thIS 
mput £lIe If you want to save the old contents of the file it should be copIed to a 
dIfferent £lIe name. Option 1) should be used in order to interactively create the 
mput £lIe for a new system model, while option 2) allows the user to respecify 
portIons of the system model without having to recreate the whole file. The 
edItmg options available are: 
1) EdIt component group speafications; 
2) Edit mirumum cut set specifications; 
3) EdIt the near coincident fault model; 
4) Edi t the common mode failure model; 
5) Change the design life (mission) time; 
6) Change no. of tIme intervals for graphing; 
7) Change number of Monte Carlo histories; 
8) Change the non-analog default values; 
9) QUlt editing / Run Monte Carlo simulation. 
The followmg sectIons discuss the various optIons and their association, If any, 
WI th the HARP program. 
2.1. Component Group Specification 
Component groups are sets of one or more identical components operatmg in 
actIve parallel. By Identical we mean that components from the same group have 
the same ccnstant failure rate, or have the same Weibull parameters if time-
dependent rates are being used. In the HARP nomenclature component groups 
are referred to as component types or stages of redundant components. Unlike ~he 
HARP WhICh allows the optIon of specifying component repair rates, we instead 
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allow the user to associate with each group a specified number of spare 
components which may be mserted mto the system model m place of faIled 
components. InsertIon of spares is eqUivalent to mstantaneous repair of failed 
components and IS consistent with the method of behavlOral decompOSItIon 
which is particularly valid if repair rates are orders of magmtude greater than 
component failure rates. It is assumed that the spare component replaces the 
failed component in good-as-new condition. Thus, if time-dependent (increasing) 
\Velbull rates are bemg used, the failure rate of the installed spare will be less than 
the rates of the other group components since it's been operational for less tIme If 
constant failure rates are bemg used, then the spare Simply resumes the failure 
rate of the origmal and there is no change m the total group failure rate To 
complete the specificatIon of component groups, the system modeler must give. 
1) The total number of component groups; 
2) The number of components m each group; 
3) The number of spares available for each group; 
4) A distinct name for each component group; 
5) The constant failure rate of components from each group; 
6) The Welbull modulus for components from each group; 
7) The Weibull scale parameter for components from each group; 
8) The HARP fault/error-handling model file name for each group. 
The HARP provides the option of choosing among several time-dependent 
distnbutions for component failure rates. We, however, implement only a 
Welbull rate of the form 
where m is the Weibull modulus and e is the Weibull scale parameter. If only a 
constant failure rate IS required, then both the Weibull modulus and scale 
parameter should be given as zero in 6) and 7). However, a Weibull component 
faIlure rate may be specified with a constant failure rate offset, and in this case the 
value given for 5) need not be zero. The time-dependent self-transition sampling 
method WhICh we Implement [6] allows for the use of only time mcreasmg 
Weibull rates, so given moduli must be greater than one If no fault handling is 
deSIred for a group, NONE should be entered m 8) as the fault/error-handling 
model file name. 
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2.2. Minimum Cut Sets 
At any tIme during the model simulatIon indivIdual components are classifIed as 
bemg operatIonal or failed. A failed component replaced by a spare is considered 
to be operatIonal, while components which are not replaced remain failed. At the 
begmnmg of the simulation time all components are assumed to be operational. 
All possible combinations of operational and failed components form the possible 
states the system may be in during a simulation run. Altogether a system with N 
components has 2N system states. Of these, we are interested in only two 
categories· states for which the system is operational, and the system failure states 
To determine the state of the system, we compare the set of all failed components 
WIth the specifIed minimum cut sets for the modeled system. Minimum cut sets 
Identify groups of minimal number of components which must not all be failed if 
the system is to be operational [7]. Thus if we find that all components in a 
partIcular cut set are failed, then we know that the system has failed. To speCIfy 
the minimum cut sets it is necessary to have the components uniquely ordered It 
IS the convention in thIS work to sequentially number all the components (but not 
spares) begmning with Component 1 in Group 1 through to the last component m 
the hIghest numbered group. See for example how the components are numbered 
in the 3-processor/2-memory/1-bus reliability block diagram shown m FIg. 2.1 
With the components numbered as such, the system modeler must evaluate the 
minimum cut sets and input them to the Monte Carlo program. For the 3P2M1 B 
example, the minimum cut sets are: (6), (4,5), (1,2,3). 
GROUP 1 
(PROCESSOR) 
-
1 I--I 
2 
- 3 i'-
r---
-
GROUP 2 
(MEMORY) 
4 
5 
i'-
-
GROUP 3 
(BUS) 
6 
Figure 2.1. ReliabIlity block dIagram for 3P2:MIB system model. 
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2.3. Near Coincident Faults 
A near cOincIdent fault (NCF) is a system failure event whlch occurs when the 
fallure of a component Interferes with the fault recovery process of the component 
Just prevlously failed The HARP allows the system modeler to choose among 
four options for speafying the the NCF behavior of the system: 
1) All incluslve NCF's; 
2) Same component NCF's; 
3) User defined NCF's; 
4) No NCF's allowed. 
Relying on values supplied by the HARP coverage models (see AppendIx A), we 
have lmplemented these NCF options in our program in a manner consistent 
WIth that of the HARP. For type 1 NCF's, the failure of any component may fatally 
Interfere with the fault recovery of any other component, whereas for type 2 
NCF's, only a component failure within the same group could interfere with fault 
recovery of a component from that group. If neither of these types adequately 
characterizes the NCF behavior of the system, the user can explicitly define 
mterferIng component groups (option 3), or SImply choose to Ignore the 
occurrence of NCF's (option 4). Since the components in groups are idenhcal, user 
defmed NCF's can be speclfled in terms of group numbers with the understanding 
that the relationship given among groups applies actually to each of the 
Indlvidual components of the groups. Thus, for each component group, the 
system modeler can provide a listing of all the groups by number whose 
components can interfere with the fault recovery of a component from the 
partlcular group in question. For example, Fig. 2.2 shows user defined interfering 
groups for the 3P2Ml B system model. In this case, a processor fallure could 
Interfere with fault recovery of another processor or with fault recovery from a 
memory error, while either another memory fault or a bus failure would interfere 
WIth memory fault recovery, but would not Interfere with fault recovery of a 
processor failure. 
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Group Group Interfering Groups 
Number Name Llsted By Number 
1 processor 1 
2 memory 1,2,3 
3 bus (none) 
Figure 2.2. Interfering component groups for 3P2MIB system model 
2.4. Common Mode Failures 
A common mode failure (CMF) event occurs when more than one system 
component fails due to a smgle common cause (such as lightening, fIre, explosion, 
vibration, flood, power faIlure, or faulty maintenance). In this work, CMF's are 
consldered to be random events and can therefore be characterized as havmg 
constant eMF event rates. We allow the system modeler the option of specifying 
none or up to several different CMF events. Each event may be modeled using 
one of the following ophons to be dIscussed presently: 
1) Beta-factor; 
2) Random generated; 
3) User defmed; 
4) System failure. 
Smce the abllity to obtain eMF data is fairly limited, the eMF models presented 
here are rather loosely constructed so that the input data required is minimal. 
2.4.1. Beta-Factor Model for Common Mode Failure Events 
The p-factor model [7] can be appbed to any number of the component groups To 
apply the model interactively, a component group number must first be selected 
If the component failure rate for this group is constant, the value IS dIsplayed and 
then the system modeler is asked to estimate what fraction p of the component 
fallure rate IS due to common cause The component failure rate is then reduced 
by thls fractional amount and a new eMF event rate IS established to make up the 
difference. Now the failure rate of components in the group' consIsts of the sum of 
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two parts an Independent part which acts In parallel and a common mode part 
whIch acts In senes The chance that only a single component fails IS reduced by 
an amount now allotted to the chance that every component in the group could 
fall at once, thus causIng immediate system failure. If the component faIlure rate 
for the group selected is a time dependent Weibull rate, then the ~-factor model 
cannot be generally applied. In this case the user is asked to estimate a constant 
CMF event rate to act in series with the group components At any hme, the total 
component faIlure rate is the sum of the Welbull rate plus the CMF event rate 
2.4.2. Random Generated Common Mode Failure Events 
For the ~-factor model, a CMF event would fail all of the components In a group 
causIng immediate system failure. Tills IS a most severe type of CMF To model 
the uncertaInty in the severity of a particular CMF event, the system modeler has 
the option of letting the number of components which fail due to a CMF event be 
random. To do thIS the modeler must specify a CMF event rate and also give the 
maXImum number of components from each group which could be failed by thIS 
event. If the event occurs during simulation, the number of components from 
each group whIch fail is selected randomly between one and the maximum 
number specified (if greater than zero). In this case it is possible that a CMF event 
may not cause immediate system failure. If the system survives the CMF event, 
the components failed by the event remain failed No spares are used 
2.4.3. User Defined Common Mode Failure Events 
If more data IS available regarding the occurrence of a particular CMF event, the 
system modeler may wish to specify a more detailed model for the event This IS 
done Interactively by first giving the CMF event rate Then the user IS asked the 
number of next state possibilIties expected if the event should happed to occur, 
and must specify probabilities for the likelihood of entering each of these states. 
These next state probabilIties are automatIcally normalized to sum to one and 
stored as entries in the next state probability vector for the event. Each of the next 
state possibilities must in tum be specified by giving the number of components 
from each group which would be failed by the event. If the event occurs during 
simulation of the model, the next system state is determIned by summIng in order 
the entries of the probability vector until the sum exceeds a generated random 
11 
value between 0 and 1. The latest entry posItIon encountered while summing 
then corresponds to the next system state. It would be tedIous to enter too many 
next state possibilitIes, and generally there IS insufficient data available to do so. It 
may be approprIate to lump the many next state possibilities into Just a few states 
One state could perhaps be specified to guarantee WIth a certain probabIlity that 
system faIlure WIll occur, and two or three more states whIch have a chance of not 
bemg system failure states. 
2.4.4. System Failure Common Mode Failure Events 
The last option for modelIng a CMF event is to treat the event as if it were an all 
mclusive NCF resulting in immediate system failure. In this case, Just a constant 
CMF rate for the event must be specified. System failure CMF events can also be 
used to model SIngle POInt failures as an alternative to relying on the HARP 
coverage models. A SIngle point failure (SPF) occurs when fault handlIng does 
not prevent a component failure from causing immediate failure of the system 
2.5. Other Modeling Parameters and Default Values 
Before Monte Carlo simulation of the system model can begin, the user must 
speCIfy the deSIgn life or mission time for the model. The units used for the 
deSIgn life should of course be consistent with the component failure rates and 
any CMF event rates Also the user must choose an integer (between 1 and 300) 
for the number of tIme intervals within the design life for reporting the system 
unrelIability In dIscrete time steps for graphing. The number of Monte Carlo 
histories (or trials) to run must also be specified. In addition, the user has the 
optIon of changing two default values internal to the program: the so called 
"analog switch" and the failure biasing factor. The first involves the case-splitting 
method we Implement [1] for sampling the distribution function of tImes to the 
next state tranSItIon. If dUrIng simulation of the model the expected number of 
state tranSItions wIthin the remaInIng lIfe hme IS large, normal analog samplmg 
is used. Otherwise non-analog sampling from a modified distribution functIon 
forces tranSItIons to occur WIthin the remaining mISSIon time. If the expected 
number of transitions is very small, rare event non-analog sampling is used and 
could continue forcing transitions indefimtely (if there are repair rates) or untIl 
the system reaches a failed state. We note that forcing tranSItions causes more of 
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the ~10nte Carlo historIes to end in system failure which helps to reduce the 
sampling vanance, but has the potential of being computationally time 
consummg To Improve run-hme of the program, we arbItrarily switch to analog 
samphng exclusively after 90 percent of the missIOn hme per history has been 
Simulated. On some trial problems we have observed that the program runs most 
effiCiently (highest figure of merit) when about two-thirds of the Monte Carlo 
histories end in system failure. To aid the user in setting the switch, the fraction 
of hiS tones endmg m system faIlure IS dIsplayed at the terminal after each run of 
the program. If it is too low, better results may be obtamed by rerunning the 
program with the analog SWItch set higher to perhaps 95 percent. The failure 
blasmg factor, on the other hand, IS less critical than the analog switch Smce our 
code employs behavioral decomposition with no repair rates, all state transitions 
are necessarily faIlure oriented so there is no need to bias the system toward 
fallmg If time dependent rates are used however, failure biasing may be 
Significant due to the fact that the self-transition probability [6] may become large 
Even so the default value of 0.5 IS likely to be sufficient in all cases where time 
dependent rates are bemg used. Further investigation is necessary regarding the 
optimal setting for these default values. 
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3. Example Models and Results 
The Monte Carlo program writes the results of the unreliability calculations to a 
fIle named OUTMC.DAT. In addition to the overall mission tIme unrelIability, 
the soluhon mcludes the unrelIability attributed to each component group and for 
the total exhaustion of hardware includmg all groups, as well as the unreliabIhty 
due to single point failures, near coincident faults, and common mode failures. 
To compute the SPF and NCF unrehabllitles we rely on values supphed by the 
HARP coverage models (see Appendix A), whereas the unreliability due to CMF is 
computed dIrectly by our program without using the HARP. File OUTGR DAT 
provides data for graphing the overall system unreliability plus or mmus the 
standard devlatlOn (68 percent confIdence) over the specified number of time 
mtervals witrun the design life. To avoid overwriting these two output flles, they 
should be copied to a different file name before the Monte Carlo program is rerun 
The examples which follow demonstrate the use and capability of the Monte Carlo 
program. Both of the system models presented here are benchmark (tutorial) 
problems appearing m the HARP literature [4,5]. The results we present were 
computed on a Sun SP ARCstation 1 We found that our program runs about 
tWIce as fast on the Sun than on the V AX 11/785 where the program was 
previously installed. 
3.1. 3-Processor/2-Memory/1-Bus System model 
The reliability block diagram for this model is shown in Fig. 2.1. Let the failure 
rate of each processor be 1D-4/hr, each memory unit be 1D-s/hr, and that of the bus 
be 10-6/hr [4,5]. We wish first to consider some perfect-coverage (no HARP fault 
handling) examples which show the effect of using the various CMF event 
optIons. Suppose, for example, we model a processor CMF event using the ~­
factor model. Fig. 31 shows how this affects the overall system unreliabihty at 10 
hours for values of ~ ranging from 0 to 20 percent. The analytic solution is trivial 
m thIS case and IS also plotted in the flgure to show the correctness of the Monte 
Carlo calculations For higher values of ~, the chance of CMF of the processors 
and, hence, the probability of system failure is greater corresponding to the rise in 
system unrelIability as seen in the figure. In Appendices B.1 and B.2 we provide 
lIstmgs of the Monte Carlo outpu_ flIes for the cases ~=O (no CMF's) and ~=20 
percent. Note that when using the ~-factor model, the component failure rate is 
000025 
3 
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~ 
0000:0 .::j ,~ 
1 ~/f/ 
>,00001 5 3 / 1 r ~000010 ~ / 
c..J ~~ 
:J ~ ~ 
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000000 li'i~i-'i~"i~i~,--~'T'~i'iri ~i ,~i~"i~iTiTi-r-,~~~~~ 
o 00 0 05 0 10 0 , 5 C 20 
beta 
Figure 3.1. Plot of 3P2M1B system unreliability (and 68% confidence interval) 
at 10 hours with processor CMFs as ~ increases from 0 to 20 
percent. The dotted line is the analytical solution. 
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reduced by ~-percent and a new CMF event rate is established to make up the 
difference. Thus in Appendix B.2, we see that the processor failure rate has been 
reduced by 20 percent from 10·4/hr to 8x10,s/hr, and the difference of 2x10,s/hr 
became the transition rate for eMF Event 1. When using the other options to 
model CMF events, no component failure rates are modified in this manner. 
Instead, the user speafies a eMF event rate which acts in addition to any of the 
component rates previously specified. The impact of eMF's on the overall 
unreliability of the system can be varied according to the option used to model the 
event. For example, Table 3.1 compares the 3P2M1B perfect-coverage system 
unreliab;lity at 10 hours in the case where no CMF's were allowed, and three cases 
which included a eMF event modeled by different options. In each of the three 
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cases the eMF event rate was given as 1(}6 Ihr. For the random event case, the next 
state was specifIed as (3,2,0) wluch means that at most all three processors and both 
memory umts could be failed if the event occurs. The random outcomes for the 
next state are then (1,1,0), (2,1,0), (3,1,0), (1,2,0), (2,2,0), and (3,2,0). Of these SIX, four 
are certam to be system failure states and thus the event has at least a two-thirds 
chance of causmg system faIlure. On the other hand, the user defmed event was 
arranged to have only a one-third chance or more of being the cause of system 
faIlure and so the unreliability in this case IS less. The next state probabilIty vector 
was gIven as (0.33, 0.27, 0.18, 0.22) and the corresponding next states as [(3,2,1), 
(2,0,0), (2,1,0), (1,1,0)]. The fIrst state (3,2,1) guarantees a 33 percent chance of system 
faIlure, whIle the other states mayor may not be system failure states depending 
on the state of mdlvldual components at the tIme the CMF event occurs. For the 
last case in Table 3 1, the CMF event had a 100 percent chance of causmg system 
failure and so the unreliability in this case is the highest. 
Output Ftle eMF Event Unreliabiltty 
AppendIx B.l None (9.57 ± 0.87) X 10-6 
AppendIx B.3 Random (1.69 ± 0.12) X 10-5 
Generated 
Appendix B.4 User (1.26 ± 0.10) X 10-5 
Defined 
AppendIX B.5 System (2.03 ± 0.13) X 10-5 
FaIlure 
Table 3.1. Results showmg the effects of using different CMF event options. 
We next consIder an Imperfect-coverage 3P2M1B example utillZing the HARP 
fault/ error-handling capabilities for modeling single point and near coincident 
faults For handhng processor faults, we use the ARIES model shown in Fig. 3.2, 
and for memory faults the Probabilities and Moments model shown in Fig. 3.3. 
For handling NCF's, user-defmed interfering groups as shown in Fig. 2.2 are 
specified Using the same component failure rates as before, Fig 3.4 shows the 
overall system unreliabIlity as a function of hme for two cases In the fIrst case no 
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eMF's were allowed, and for the second case we included in the model 
speCIfication a system failure eMF event wIth rate 10-6/hr Induding the eMF 
event mcreased the unreliability as seen m the fIgure. The detaIled results for 
these two cases are provided in Appendices B 6 and B.7. In AppendIx B.B are 
imperfect-coverage results (without eMF's) for the 3P2M1B example usmg time-
dependent rates rather than constant rates as before. A Weibull modulus of 2.5 
was used for each of the components and the scale parameters were chosen so that 
the unrehability at 10 hours was comparable with the unreliability obtained when 
constant rates were used. The unreliability as a function of time for thIS case is 
plotted in Fig. 3.5. Usmg time-dependent rates increased the computational time 
by a factor of ten over the constant rate case. 
Values reqUired by HARP as Input -
Probability that fault IS tranSient 85 
Mean duration of tranSient fault 05 
Probability that fault IS catastrophiC .001 
Number of tranSient recovery phases 6 
Phase Durallon EHectlveness 
1 01 0 
2 02 1 
3 03 2 
4045 
5 05 7 
6 08 01 
Coverage of permanent fault 85 
GIVen that a fault occurs. the following parameters 
are derived from the above HARP Input values -
CR probability that fault IS noncatastrophlc 
PF probability that sys:em crashes 
PE probability that system enters recovery state 
PR probablhty that tranSient recovery IS successful 
Figure 3.2. The ARIES transient-fault recovery model and parameterization 
for processors [5]. 
PROS -\BILITIES A:-;D ~fO\IE~TS 
TRA:-;SIE:-;T RESTORATIO~ EXIT 
EXIT PROBABILITY 9800 
FIRST ~10~lE"T OF TI:-'lE TO EXIT 0 
SECO:-;D ~10\lE~T OF TI\IE TO EXIT 0 
THIRD ~10~{E"T OF TI:-'lE TO EXIT 0 
RECO:-;FIGURATIO:-; COVERAGE EXIT 
EXIT PROBABILITY 1615e-Ol 
FIRST ~lO~lE:-;T OF TIME TO EXIT 0 4500 
SECO:-;D ~lO~lE~T OF TI~lE TO EXIT 0 2500 
THIRD ~lO~lE~T OF TI~E TO EXIT 0 
SI:-;CLE POI:-;T FAILVRE EXIT 
EXIT PROBABILITY 3850e-02 
FIRST ~lO~lE~T OF TIME TO EXIT 0 
SECO:-;D ~lO~lE~T OF TI~fE TO EXIT 0 
THIRD MO~lE:-;T OF TI~E TO EXIT 0 
Figure 3.3. Description of the FEHM for Memory Subsystem [5]. 
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Figure 3.4. Plot of system unreliability (and 68% confidence interval) as a 
function of tIme for the 3P2M1 B model with HARP fault handling 
for two cases: a) No common mode failures and b) A system 
failure common mode failure event with rate 10-6. 
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Figure 3.5. Plot of system unreliability (and 68% confidence interval) as a 
function of time for the 3P2Ml B model using time-dependent 
component failure rates. 
Figure 3.6. Fault tree rep"~sent3tion of a fault tolerant jet engine control 
system. (If two basic event labels are the same, they represent 
the same component) [5]. 
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3.2 Jet Engine Control System Model 
To demonstrate the capability of the Monte Carlo method to SImulate larger 
models, we consider next the Jet engine control problem which has twenty 
components distributed among seven groups. The constant component failure 
rates are hsted in Table 3.2. From the system fault tree shown in Fig. 3.6, we were 
able to determine 171 minimum cut sets. In the first example we use the HARP 
Markov version of the CARE III model shown in Fig. 3.7 for fault handlmg, WIth 
the error detectability for data collectors set at 0.97, and 0.99 for all other groups. 
The Monte Carlo solution is listed in Appendix B.9 It took Just over 8 minutes to 
run 40,000 histories. The overall unreliability result of (0 111±0.009)xl 0.4 
compares well with the HARP result of 0.11153xl0-' [5]. In this example (which 
neglects NCF's), the single point failure probability contributes most significantly 
to the system unreliability. Rather than using the CARE ill model, we also solved 
the problem using CMF's to equivalently model this single point failure 
probabihty We used the ~-factor model with ~ set at 0.02 for data collectors and 
0.01 for all other groups. The results for this case, given in Appendix B.10, are 
comparable with the results in Appendix B.9. To conclude the jet engine control 
examples, the plot in Fig. 3.8 shows the effect of using spare components. The 
cases plotted are perfect-coverage unreliability results (without HARP fault 
handling or CMF'S) in which no spares were used (Appendix B.ll) as compared to 
a case in which two spare power supplies were available (Appendix B.12). 
Including the spare components increased the computational time by only 100 
seconds over the no-spare case. The overall perfect-coverage unreliability at 10 
hours WIth no spares was computed to be (0.273±O.006)x10·6 in good agreement 
with the HARP result of O.27088x1()-6 [5]. 
Stage BasIC e .. ents FaJlure rate 
Power suppIJes 1,2,3 300 x 10-5 
Input controllers 4,5,6 150 x 10-5 
Data collectors 7,8 700 x 10-6 I CPU's 9,10,11 326 x 10-5 
1553 buses 12,13,14 100 x 10-5 I Output drivers 15.16,17 300 x 10-6 
Cross channel data lmk receIvers 18 19,20 426 x 10-6 I 
Table 3.2 Description of Stages [groups] and Basic Events [components] for 
the Jet Engine Control System [5]. 
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Parameters, assuming an faults 
are permanent 
(those not listed are 0 0) 
Fault Detection Ratec$ = 360 per hr 
Error Propagallon Rate £ = 3600 per hr 
Error Productron Rate p = '80 per hr 
Reconfiguratlon Probability PA = 1 0 
Error Detectabillty q = 0 97 or 0 99 
1Ia tranSient or intermittent aC'Jve 
durallon lime, gIVen tranSItion 
only to state B or BE 
lip Intermltent ben'9n durallen lime 
Figure 3.7. Markov version of the CARE In single-fault model [5]. 
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Figure 3.8 Plot of perfect-coverage system unreliability (and 68% confidence 
interval) as a function of time for the jet engine control model 
for two cases: a) No spare components and b) Two spare power 
supplies available. 
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Appendix A: Interfacing with the HARP 
The HARP provldes several coverage models (FEHM's) of varying complexity and 
applIcability for handling transient, intermittent, and permanent faults [3]. The 
system modeler may apply an appropriate FEHM for handling component faults 
within a particular group. For each FEHM specified, our Monte Carlo program 
relies on the HARP for computing the (exit) probability R.o (transient restoration) 
that the system will recover from a transient fault, Co (permanent coverage) that 
the system will be successfully reconfigured to eliminate a permanent (or 
intermittent or transient) fault, and So (single point failure) that the fault will cause 
system failure. These values (called exit probabilities) must then be adjusted to 
account for the state-dependent probability N that the system may fail due to a near 
comcident fault. For this purpose, the HARP also provides the first three moments 
in time (RMI, RM2, RM3, CMI, CM2, CM3, 5MI, 5M2, 5M3) required to reach each 
eXIt (R, C, 5) in the fault handlmg process. These moments are applied in a Taylor 
series expansion in order to get the state-dependent fault handlmg exit probability 
Likewise, C and 5 are computed. The NCF probability N is then equal to I-R-C-5. 
For each component, the NCF rate YE is the sum of the failure rates (at the time of 
the fault) of all other (operational) components whose failure could interfere with 
the fault recovery process of that particular component. If only constant failure 
rates are used, the derivatives if and 1f are zero which -greatly simplifies the 
computation. The following is a listing of the Sun command file (called a 
makefile) used to compile and link our Monte Carlo source code file (mccode.f) to 
the appropriate HARP FEHM source files to form the executable file mcHARP.out. 
mcHARP.out : 
f77 -dalign -0 mcHARP.out \ 
cfhmmc.f ari.f aries.f ariesinp.f \ 
car.f care.f careinp.f cformat.f covfac.f devgen.f \ 
d~s.f distinp.f dists.f emp.f empir.f empirinp.f \ 
espn.f espninp.f harpsim.f mom.f moments.f \ 
mominp.f simdrv.f sta~es.f mccode.f 
The ".f" indicates Sun FORTRAN 77 source code. The HARP main program 
CFEHM in file cfhmmc.f was altered to allow users to only create or edit FEHM's 
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and to run our Monte Carlo code as a subroutine of CFEHM The HARP 
subroutme COVNOM m file covfac.f is called by our code to get the eXIt 
probabilities and moments for each user-specified FEInvi. The values returned by 
COVNOM are saved on a file named VALUES.DAT. Alternatively, our program 
can be run WIthout interfacing with the HARP using the executable file mcpro.out 
compiled from the source code mcpro.f. In this case FEInvi values can be read from 
the VALUES.DAT file or perfect-coverage values (C=l, R=S=N=O) can be used. In 
eIther verSIOn of the program, we separately implement the handling of common 
mode failures without using the HARP. 
Appendix B 
Monte Carlo Output Files 
for Example Problems 
======================================= 
MONTE CARLO UNRELIABILITY CALCULATION 
=====================--================= 
NUMBER OF COMPONENT GROUPS: 3 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP processor 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP processor 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT processor 
WEIBULL MODULUS OF COMPONENT processor 
SCALE PARAMETER OF COMPONENT processor 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP processor 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP memory 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP memory 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT memory 
WEIBULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT memory 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT memory 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP memory 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP bus 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP bus 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT bus 
WE I BULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT bus 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT bus 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP bus 
MISSION TIME FOR THIS MODEL: 
NUMBER OF MONTE CARLO HISTORIES: 
NEAR COINCIDENT FAULT MODEL: 
2 
APPENDIX B.1 
3 
o 
0.1000D-03 
0.00000+00 
0.00000+00 
NONE 
2 
o 
0.1000D-04 
0.00000+00 
0.00000+00 
NONE 
1 
o 
0.10000-05 
0.00000+00 
0.00000+00 
: NONE 
10.00 
40000 
4 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 1 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.99862450-09 +/- 0.77958270-11 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.24309970-17 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.78065650-02 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 2 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.85981340-08 +/- 0.11714770-08 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.54894320-13 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.13624780+00 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 3 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.95649560-05 +/- 0.87411790-06 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.30563280-07 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.91387550-01 
OVERALL UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF HARDWARE 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.95745520-05 +/- 0.87411600-06 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.30563150-07 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.91295760-01 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO SINGLE POINT FAILURE 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.00000000+00 +/- 0.00000000+00 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.00000000+00 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.00000000+00 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO NEAR COINCIDENT FAULT 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.00000000+00 +/- 0.00000000+00 
SAMPLE VARIru~CE = 0.00000000+00 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.00000000+00 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO COMMON MODE FAILURE 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.00000000+00 +/- 0.00000000+00 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.00000000+00 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.00000000+00 
OVERALL SYSTEM CALCULATION: 
=================--=--== 
**************************************************** 
* UNRELIABILITY = 0.95745520-05 +/- 0.87411600-06* 
* SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.30563150-07 * 
* COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION= 0.91295760-01 * 
* FIGURE OF MERIT = 0.13506350+11 * 
* TIME PER HISTORY = 0.24225000-02 * 
**************************************************** 
CPU CALCULTION TIME: 0.9690E+02 SECONDS 
3 
======================================= 
MONTE CARLO UNRELIABILITY CALCULATION 
======================================= 
NUMBER OF COMPONENT GROUPS: 3 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP processor 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP processor 
FAILURE RATE OF COMPONENT processor 
WEIBULL MODULUS OF COMPONENT processor 
SCALE PARAMETER OF COMPONENT processor 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP processor 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP memory 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP memory 
FAILURE RATE OF COMPONENT memory 
WEIBULL MODULUS OF COMPONENT memory 
SCALE PARAMETER OF COMPONENT memory 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP memory 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP bus 
InxMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP bus 
FAILURE RATE OF COMPONENT bus 
WEIBULL MODULUS OF COMPONENT bus 
SCALE PARAMETER OF COMPONENT bus 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP bus 
TRANSITION RATE FOR CMF EVENT 1: 
MISSION TIME FOR THIS MODEL: 
NUMBER OF MONTE CARLO HISTORIES: 
NEAR COINCIDENT FAULT MODEL: 
APPENDIX B.2 
3 
o 
0.80000-04 
0.00000+00 
0.00000+00 
NONE 
2 
o 
0.10000-04 
0.00000+00 
0.00000+00 
NONE 
1 
o 
0.10000-05 
0.00000+00 
0.00000+00 
: NONE 
0.20000-04 
10.00 
40000 
4 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 1 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.50668460-09 +/- 0.53058860-11 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.11260970-17 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.10471770-01 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 2 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.11713660-07 +/- 0.12499420-08 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.62494180-13 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.10670800+00 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUST~ON OF COMPONENT. GROUP 3 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.10480770-04 +/- 0.85590850-06 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.29303180-07 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.81664650-01 
4 
OVERALL UNRELIABILITY OUE TO EXHAUSTION OF HAROWARE 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.10492990-04 +/- 0.85590570-06 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.29302980-07 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.81569270-01 
UNRELIABILITY OUE TO SINGLE POINT FAILURE 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.00000000+00 +/- 0.00000000+00 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.00000000+00 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.00000000+00 
UNRELIABILITY OUE TO NEAR COINCIOENT FAULT 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.00000000+00 +/- 0.00000000+00 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.00000000+00 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.00000000+00 
UNRELIABILITY OUE TO COMMON MOOE FAILURE 
-----------------------------------------
UNRELIABILITY = 0.19921200-03 +/- 0.36033300-05 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.51935950-06 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.18087910-01 
OVERALL SYSTEM CALCULATION: 
=========================== 
**************************************************** 
* UNRELIABILITY = 0.20970500-03+/- 0.36894510-05 * 
* SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.54448180-06 * 
* COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION= 0.17593530-01 * 
* FIGURE OF MERIT = 0.80792230+09 * 
* TIME PER HISTORY = 0.22732490-02 * 
**************************************************** 
CPU CALCULTION TIME: 0.9093E+02 SECONOS 
5 
======================================= 
MONTE CARLO UNRELIABILITY CALCULATION 
======================================= 
NUMBER OF COMPONENT GROUPS: 3 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP processor 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP processor 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT processor 
WEIBULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT processor 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT processor 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP processor 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP memory 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP memory 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT memory 
WEIBULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT memory 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT memory 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP memory 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP bus 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP bus 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT bus 
WEIBULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT bus 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT bus 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP bus 
TRANSITION RATE FOR CMF EVENT 1: 
MISSION TIME FOR THIS MODEL: 
NUMBER OF MONTE CARLO HISTORIES: 
NEAR COINCIDENT FAULT MODEL: 
APPENDIX B.3 
3 
o 
0.10000-03 
0.00000+00 
0.00000+00 
NONE 
2 
o 
0.10000-04 
0.00000+00 
0.00000+00 
NONE 
1 
o 
0.10000-05 
0.00000+00 
0.00000+00 
: NONE 
0.10000-05 
10.00 
40000 
4 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 1 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.17795480-08 +/- 0.19509700-09 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.15225140-14 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.10963290+00 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 2 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.11244850-07 +/- 0.13820430-08 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.76401710-13 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.12290450+00 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 3 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.95957930-05 +/- 0.87684070-06 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.30753990-07 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.91377620-01 
6 
OVERALL UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF HARDWARE 
---------------------------------------------------
UNRELIABILITY = 0.9608817D-05 +/- 0.8768383D-06 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.3075382D-07 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.9125351D-01 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO SINGLE POINT FAILURE 
UNRELIABILITY = O.OOOOOOOD+OO +/- O.OOOOOOOD+OO 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = O.OOOOOOOD+OO 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = O.OOOOOOOD+OO 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO NEAR COINCIDENT FAULT 
UNRELIABILITY = O.OOOOOOOD+OO +/- O.OOOOOOOD+OO 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = O.OOOOOOOD+OO 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = O.OOOOOOOD+OO 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO COMMON MODE FAILURE 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.7337463D-05 +/- 0.7670451D-06 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.2353433D-07 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.1045382D+00 
OVERALL SYSTEM CALCULATION: 
=========================== 
**************************************************** 
* UNRELIABILITY = 0.1694628D-04 +/- 0.1163477D-05* 
* SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.5414713D-07 * 
* COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION= 0.6865677D-01 * 
* FIGURE OF MERIT = 0.7623612D+10 * 
* TIME PER HISTORY = 0.2422500D-02 * 
**************************************************** 
CPU CALCULATION TIME: 0.9690E+02 SECONDS 
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======================================= 
MONTE CARLO UNRELIABILITY CALCULATION 
======================================= 
NUMBER OF COMPONENT GROUPS: 3 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP processor 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP processor 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT processor 
WEIBULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT processor 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT processor 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP processor 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP memory 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP memory 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT memory 
WEIBULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT memory 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT memory 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP memory 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP bus 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP bus 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT bus 
WE I BULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT bus 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT bus 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP bus 
TRANSITION RATE FOR CMF EVENT 1: 
MISSION TIME FOR THIS MODEL: 
NUMBER OF MONTE CARLO HISTORIES: 
NEAR COINCIDENT FAULT MODEL: 
APPENDIX B.4 
3 
o 
0.10000-03 
0.00000+00 
0.00000+00 
NONE 
2 
o 
0.10000-04 
0.00000+00 
0.00000+00 
NONE 
1 
o 
0.10000-05 
0.00000+00 
0.00000+00 
: NONE 
0.10000-05 
10.00 
40000 
4 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 1 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.29656650-08 +/- 0.33935130-09 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.46063710-14 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.11442670+00 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 2 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.11291670-07 +/- 0.13518430-08 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.73099150-13 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.11972030+00 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT ~ROUP 3 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.88700400-05 +/- 0.84312650-06 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.28434490-07 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.95053300-01 
8 
OVERALL UNRELIABILITY OUE TO EXHAUSTION OF HAROWARE 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.88842970-05 +/- 0.8431239D-06 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.28434320-07 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.94900470-01 
UNRELIABILITY OUE TO SINGLE POINT FAILURE 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.00000000+00 +/- 0.00000000+00 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.00000000+00 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.00000000+00 
UNRELIABILITY OUE TO NEAR COINCIOENT FAULT 
tnnRELIABILITY = 0.00000000+00 +/- 0.00000000+00 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.00000000+00 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.00000000+00 
UNRELIABILITY OUE TO COMMON MOOE FAILURE 
-----------------------------------------
UNRELIABILITY = 0.37166200-05 +/- 0.54566280-06 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.11909920-07 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.14681700+00 
OVERALL SYSTEM CALCULATION: 
=========================== 
**************************************************** 
* UNRELIABILITY = 0.12600920-04 +/- 0.10034710-05* 
* SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.40278200-07 * 
* COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION= 0.79634790-01 * 
* FIGURE OF MERIT = 0.10245470+11 * 
* TIME PER HISTORY = 0.24232500-02 * 
**************************************************** 
CPU CALCULATION TIME: 0.9693E+02 SECONOS 
9 
======================================= 
MONTE CARLO UNRELIABILITY CALCULATION 
======================================= 
NUMBER OF COMPONENT GROUPS: 3 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP processor 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP processor 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT processor 
WEIBULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT processor 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT processor 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP processor 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP memory 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP memory 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT memory 
WEIBULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT memory 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT memory 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP memory 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP bus 
InJMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP bus 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT bus 
WEI BULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT bus 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT bus 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP bus 
TRANSITION RATE FOR CMF EVENT 1: 
MISSION TIME FOR THIS MODEL: 
NUMBER OF MONTE CARLO HISTORIES: 
NEAR COINCIDENT FAULT MODEL: 
APPENDIX B.5 
3 
o 
0.1000D-03 
0.00000+00 
O.OOOOD+OO 
NONE 
2 
o 
0.1000D-04 
O.OOOOD+OO 
0.00000+00 
NONE 
1 
o 
0.1000D-05 
O.OOOOD+OO 
0.00000+00 
: NONE 
0.1000D-05 
10.00 
40000 
4 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 1 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.1002237D-08 +/- 0.7883135D-11 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.2485753D-17 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.7865542D-02 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 2 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.1053510D-07 +/- 0.1334953D-08 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.7128395D-13 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.1267147D+00 
UNRE~IAB~LITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 3 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.9998374D-05 +/- 0.8950161D-06 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.3204215D-07 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = O.8951617D-01 
10 
OVERALL UNRELIABILITY OUE TO EXHAUSTION OF HAROWARE 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.10009910-04 +/- 0.89501390-06 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.32042000-07 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.89412770-01 
UNRELIABILITY OUE TO SINGLE POINT FAILURE 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.00000000+00 +/- 0.00000000+00 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.00000000+00 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.00000000+00 
UNRELIABILITY OUE TO NEAR COINCIOENT FAULT 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.00000000+00 +/- 0.00000000+00 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.00000000+00 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.00000000+00 
UNRELIABILITY OUE TO COMMON MOOE FAILURE 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.1024021D-04 +/- 0.9057440D-06 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.32814890-07 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.88449770-01 
OVERALL SYSTEM CALCULATION: 
==========--================ 
**************************************************** 
* UNRELIABILITY = 0.20250120-04 +/- 0.12713370-05* 
* SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.64651880-07 * 
* COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION= 0.62781690-01 * 
* FIGURE OF MERIT = 0.63981200+10 * 
* TIME PER HISTORY = 0.24175000-02 * 
**************************************************** 
CPU CALCULATION TIME: 0.9670E+02 SECONOS 
11 
======================================= 
MONTE CARLO UNRELIABILITY CALCULATION 
======================================= 
NUMBER OF COMPONENT GROUPS: 3 
APPENDIX B.6 
3 
o 
0.1000D-03 
O.OOOOD+OO 
0.00000+00 
12 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP processor 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP processor 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT processor 
WEIBULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT processor 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT processor 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP processor CFEHM.ARI 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP memory 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP memory 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT memory 
WEI BULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT memory 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT memory 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP memory 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP bus 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP bus 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT bus 
WEIBULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT bus 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT bus 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP bus 
MISSION TIME FOR THIS MODEL: 
NUMBER OF MONTE CARLO HISTORIES: 
NEAR COINCIDENT FAULT MODEL: 
2 
o 
0.1000D-04 
0.00000+00 
0.00000+00 
FEHM.MOM 
1 
o 
0.1000D-05 
O.OOOOD+OO 
0.00000+00 
: NONE 
10.00 
80000 
3 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 1 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.6795463D-10 +/- 0.3831140D-12 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.11742110-19 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.5637790D-02 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 2 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.2249129D-09 +/- 0.43345610-10 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.15030740-15 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.19272180+00 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 3 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.9926839D-05 +/- 0.3395517D-06 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.9223627D-08 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.3420542D-01 
OVERALL UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF HARDWARE 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.9927132D-05 +/- 0.3395516D-06 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.9223621D-08 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.3420440D-01 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO SINGLE POINT FAILURE 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.1414603D-03 +/- 0.1187693D-05 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.1128492D-06 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.8395945D-02 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO NEAR COINCIDENT FAULT 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.2349318D-07 +/- 0.1660713D-07 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.2206375D-10 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.7068916D+00 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO COMMON MODE FAILURE 
UNRELIABILITY = O.OOOOOOOD+OO +/- O.OOOOOOOD+OO 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = O.OOOOOOOD+OO 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = O.OOOOOOOD+OO 
OVERALL SYSTEM CALCULATION: 
=================--========= 
**************************************************** 
* UNRELIABILITY = 0.1514109D-03+/- 0.1221061D-05 * 
* SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.1192792D-06 * 
* COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION= 0.8064548D-02 * 
* FIGURE OF MERIT = 0.2481392D+10 * 
* TIME PER HISTORY = 0.3378625D-02 * 
**************************************************** 
CPU CALCULATION TIME: 0.2703E+03 SECONDS 
13 
======================================= 
MONTE CARLO UNRELIABILITY CALCULATION 
======================================= 
NUMBER OF COMPONENT GROUPS: 3 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP processor 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP processor 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT processor 
WE I BULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT processor 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT processor 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP processor 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP memory 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP memory 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT memory 
WEIBULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT memory 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT memory 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP memory 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP bus 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP bus 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT bus 
WEIBULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT bus 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT bus 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP bus 
TRANSITION RATE FOR CMF EVENT 1: 
MISSION TIME FOR THIS MODEL: 
NUMBER OF MONTE CARLO HISTORIES: 
NEAR COINCIDENT FAULT MODEL: 
14 
APPENDIX B.7 
3 
o 
0.10000-03 
0.00000+00 
0.00000+00 
CFEHM.ARI 
2 
o 
0.10000-04 
0.00000+00 
0.00000+00 
FEHM.MOM 
1 
o 
0.10000-05 
0.00000+00 
0.00000+00 
: NONE 
0.10000-05 
10.00 
80000 
3 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 1 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.68401910-10 +/- 0.39399400-12 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.12418500-19 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.57599850-02 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 2 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.10090690-09 +/- 0.29594160-10 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.70065140-16 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.29328180+00 
UNRELIABILITY DUE T:1 EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 3 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.1032902D~04 +/- 0.34815050-06 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.96967020-08 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.33706060-01 
OVERALL UNRELIABILITY OUE TO EXHAUSTION OF HAROWARE 
---------------------------------------------------
UNRELIABILITY = 0.10329190-04 +/- 0.34815050-06 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.96966990-08 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.33705500-01 
UNRELIABILITY OUE TO SINGLE POINT FAILURE 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.14029530-03 +/- 0.11910370-05 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.11348560-06 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.84894990-02 
UNRELIABILITY OUE TO NEAR COINCIOENT FAULT 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.35612800-07 +/- 0.20555880-07 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.33803530-10 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.57720470+00 
UNRELIABILITY OUE TO COMMON MOOE FAILURE 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.99255060-05 +/- 0.34135310-06 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.93217540-08 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.34391500-01 
OVERALL SYSTEM CALCULATION: 
====================== 
**************************************************** 
* UNRELIABILITY = 0.16058570-03+/- 0.12581640-05 * 
* SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.12663810-06 * 
* COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION= 0.78348450-02 * 
* FIGURE OF MERIT = 0.23179040+10 * 
* TIME PER HISTORY = 0.34067500-02 * 
**************************************************** 
CPU CALCULATION TIME: 0.2725E+03 SECONOS 
15 
======================================= 
MONTE CARLO UNRELIABILITY CALCULATION 
======================================= 
NUMBER OF COMPONENT GROUPS: 3 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP PROCESSOR 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP PROCESSOR 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT PROCESSOR 
WEIBULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT PROCESSOR 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT PROCESSOR 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP PROCESSOR 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP MEMORY 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP MEMORY 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT MEMORY 
WEIBULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT MEMORY 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT MEMORY 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP MEMORY 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP BUS 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP BUS 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT BUS 
WE I BULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT BUS 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT BUS 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP BUS 
MISSION TIME FOR THIS MODEL: 
NUMBER OF MONTE CARLO HISTORIES: 
NEAR COINCIDENT FAULT MODEL: 
16 
APPENDIX B.8 
. 
. 3 
o 
0.00000+00 
0.2500D+01 
0.1585D+03 
CFEHM.ARI 
2 
o 
O.OOOOD+OO 
0.25000+01 
0.39810+03 
FEHM.MOM 
1 
o 
O.OOOOD+OO 
0.25000+01 
0.1000D+04 
: NONE 
10.00 
40000 
3 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 1 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.6865636D-10 +/- 0.9973916D-12 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.3979160D-19 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.1452730D-01 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 2 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.1048874D-09 +/- 0.5640234D-10 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.1272490D-15 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.53774170+00 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 3 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.1062913D-04 +/- 0.7428625D-06 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.2207379D-07 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.6988928D-01 
OVERALL UNRELIABILITY OUE TO EXHAUSTION OF HAROWARE 
---------------------------------------------------
UNRELIABILITY = 0.10629310-04 +/- 0.74286250-06 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.22073790-07 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.69888140-01 
UNRELIABILITY OUE TO SINGLE POINT FAILURE 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.14822360-03 +/- 0.26741190-05 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.28603640-06 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.18041110-01 
UNRELIABILITY OUE TO NEAR COINCIOENT FAULT 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.65970220-10 +/- 0.38927320-10 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.60613460-16 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.59007410+00 
UNRELIABILITY OUE TO COMMON MOOE FAILURE 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.00000000+00 +/- 0.00000000+00 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.00000000+00 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.00000000+00 
OVERALL SYSTEM CALCULATION: 
---------------------------
---------------------------
**************************************************** 
* UNRELIABILITY = 0.15885300-03 +/- 0.27611550-05* 
* SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.30495920-06 * 
* COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION= 0.17381830-01 * 
* FIGURE OF MERIT = 0.97256590+08 * 
* TIME PER HISTORY = 0.33716250-01 * 
**************************************************** 
CPU CALCULATION TIME: 0.1349E+04 SECONOS 
17 
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======================================= 
MONTE CARLO UNRELIABILITY CALCULATION APPENDIX B.9 
======================================= 
NUMBER OF COMPONENT GROUPS: 7 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP POWER_SUPPLY 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP POWER_SUPPLY 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT POWER SUPPLY 
WE I BULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT POWER_SUPPLY 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT POWER_SUPPLY 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP POWER_SUPPLY 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP INPUT_CONT 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP INPUT_CONT 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT INPUT CONT 
WE I BULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT INPUT_CONT 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT INPUT_CONT 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP INPUT_CONT 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP DATA COLL 
lruMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP DATA_COLL 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT DATA_COLL 
WE I BULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT DATA COLL 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT DATA-COLL 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP DATA_COLL 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP CPUs 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP CPUs 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT CPUs 
WEIBULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT CPUs 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT CPUs 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP CPUs 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP BUSSES 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP BUSSES 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT BUSSES 
WE I BULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT BUSSES 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT BUSSES 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP BUSSES 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP OUT DRIVE 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP OUT DRIVE 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT OUT-DRIVE 
WEIBULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT OUT DRIVE 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT OUT-DRIVE 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP OUT_DRIVE 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP DATA RECVR 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP DATA RECvR 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT DATA-RECVR 
WE I BULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT DATA RECVR 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT DATA-RECVR 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP DATA RECVR 
3 
o 
0.3000D-04 
0.00000+00 
0.00000+00 
FEHM.CAR 
3 
o 
0.1500D-04 
0.00000+00 
O.OOOOD+OO 
FEHM.CAR 
2 
o 
0.7000D-05 
0.00000+00 
0.00000+00 
: FEHMDC.CAR 
3 
o 
0.3260D-04 
0.00000+00 
O.OOOOD+OO 
FEHM.CAR 
3 
o 
0.1000D-04 
0.00000+00 
O.OOOOD+OO 
FEHM.CAR 
3 
o 
0.3000D-05 
O.OOOOD+OO 
O.OOOOD+OO 
FEHM.CAR 
3 
o 
0.4260D-05 
0.00000+00 
O.OOOOD+OO 
: FEHM.CAR 
MISSION TIME FOR THIS MOOEL: 
NUMBER OF MONTE CARLO HISTORIES: 
NEAR COINCIOENT FAULT MOOEL: 
10.00 
40000 
4 
UNRELIABILITY OUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 1 
----------------------------------------------------
UNRELIABILITY = 0.15753190-06 +/- 0.45687040-08 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.83492230-12 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.29001770-01 
UNRELIABILITY OUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 2 
----------------------------------------------------
UNRELIABILITY = 0.76538350-07 +/- 0.32268200-08 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.41649470-12 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.42159520-01 
UNRELIABILITY OUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 3 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.31680550-07 +/- 0.20447500-08 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.16724020-12 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.64542770-01 
UNRELIABILITY OUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 4 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.25127720-09 +/- 0.71000210-11 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.20164120-17 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.28255730-01 
UNRELIABILITY OUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 5 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.66821660-10 +/- 0.36005050-11 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.51854540-18 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.53882300-01 
UNRELIABILITY OUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 6 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.17714110-10 +/- 0.19089580-11 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.14576480-18 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.10776480+00 
UNRELIABILITY OUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 7 
19 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.25194110-10 +/- 0.20905920-11 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.17482290-18 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.82979390-01 
OVERALL UNRELIABILITY OUE TO EXHAUSTION OF HAROWARE 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.26611180-06 +/- 0.58726540-08 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.13795230-11 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.22068370-01 
UNRELIABILITY OUE TO SINGLE POINT FAILURE 
-----------------------------------------
UNRELIABILITY = 0.10837490-04 +/- 0.89721110-06 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.32199510-07 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.82787730-01 
UNRELIABILITY OUE TO NEAR COINCIOENT FAULT 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.00000000+00 +/- 0.00000000+00 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.00000000+00 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.00000000+00 
UNRELIABILITY OUE TO COMMON MODE FAILURE 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.00000000+00 +/- 0.00000000+00 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.00000000+00 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.00000000+00 
OVERALL SYSTEM CALCULATION: 
=========================== 
**************************************************** 
* UNRELIABILITY = 0.11103600-04 +/- 0.89714990-06* 
* SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.32195120-07 * 
* COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION= 0.80798110-01 * 
* FIGURE OF MERIT = 0.25767350+10 * 
* TIME PER HISTORY = 0.12054250-01 * 
**************************************************** 
CPU CALCULATION TIME: 0.4822E+03 SECONOS 
20 
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======================================= 
MONTE CARLO UNRELIABILITY CALCULATION APPENDIX B.10 
======================================= 
NUMBER OF COMPONENT GROUPS: 7 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP POWER_SUPPLY 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP POWER_SUPPLY 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT POWER_SUPPLY 
WE I BULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT POWER_SUPPLY 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT POWER_SUPPLY 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP POWER_SUPPLY 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP INPUT_CONT 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP INPUT_CONT 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT INPUT_CONT 
WEIBULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT INPUT_CONT 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT INPUT_CONT 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP INPUT_CONT 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP DATA_COLL 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP DATA_COLL 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT DATA_COLL 
WEIBULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT DATA_COLL 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT DATA_COLL 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP DATA_COLL 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP CPUs 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP CPUs 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT CPUs 
WE I BULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT CPUs 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT CPUs 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP CPUs 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP BUSSES 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP BUSSES 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT BUSSES 
WE I BULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT BUSSES 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT BUSSES 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP BUSSES 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP OUT DRIVE 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP OUT DRIVE 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT OUT-DRIVE 
WEIBULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT OUT DRIVE 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT OUT-DRIVE 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP OUT_DRIVE 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP DATA RECVR 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP DATA RE~v.R 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT DATA RECVR 
WEIBULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT DATA RECVR 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT DATA RECVR 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP DATA_RECVR 
3 
o 
0.2970D-04 
0.00000+00 
0.00000+00 
NONE 
3 
o 
0.1485D-04 
0.00000+00 
0.00000+00 
NONE 
2 
o 
0.6860D-05 
0.00000+00 
0.00000+00 
NONE 
3 
o 
0.3227D-04 
0.00000+00 
O.OOOOD+OO 
NONE 
3 
o 
0.9900D-05 
O.OOOOD+OO 
O.OOOOD+OO 
NONE 
3 
o 
0.2970D-05 
0.00000+00 
O.OOOOD+OO 
NONE 
3 
o 
0.4217D-05 
O.OOOOD+OO 
0.00000+00 
: NONE 
22 
TRANSITION RATE FOR CMF EVENT 1: 
TRANSITION RATE FOR CMF EVENT 2: 
TRANSITION RATE FOR CMF EVENT 3: 
TRANSITION RATE FOR CMF EVENT 4: 
TRANSITION RATE FOR CMF EVENT 5: 
TRANSITION RATE FOR CMF EVENT 6: 
TRANSITION RATE FOR CMF EVENT 7: 
MISSION TIME FOR THIS MODEL: 
NUMBER OF MONTE CARLO HISTORIES: 
0.3000D-06 
0.1500D-06 
0.1400D-06 
0.3260D-06 
0.1000D-06 
0.30000-07 
0.4260D-07 
10.00 
40000 
NEAR COINCIDENT FAULT MODEL: 4 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 1 
----------------------------------------------------
UNRELIABILITY = 0.1460247D-06 +/- 0.4345605D-08 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.7553712D-12 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.2975938D-01 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 2 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.7965129D-07 +/- 0.3273486D-08 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.4286284D-12 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.4109771D-01 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 3 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.3591877D-07 +/- 0.2193508D-08 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.1924591D-12 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.6106858D-01 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 4 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.25204440-09 +/- 0.7033642D-11 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.1978885D-17 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.2790636D-01 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 5 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.6588514D-10 +/- 0.3593959D-11 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.5166615D-18 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.5454885D-01 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 6 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.21318560-10 +/- 0.20468930-11 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.16759090-18 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.96014590-01 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 7 
----------------------------------------------------
UNRELIABILITY = 0.25787680-10 +/- 0.21096330-11 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.17802200-18 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.81807760-01 
OVERALL UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF HARDWARE 
---------------------------------------------------
UNRELIABILITY = 0.26195980-06 +/- 0.57809950-08 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.13367960-11 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.22068260-01 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO SINGLE POINT FAILURE 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.00000000+00 +/- 0.00000000+00 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.00000000+00 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.00000000+00 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO NEAR COINCIDENT FAULT 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.00000000+00 +/- 0.00000000+00 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.00000000+00 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.00000000+00 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO COMMON MODE FAILURE 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.11282920-04 +/- 0.91226470-06 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.33289070-07 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.80853630-01 
OVERALL SYSTEM CALCULATION: 
=========================== 
*******************************f******************** 
* UNRELIABILITY = 0.11544880-04 +/- 0.91220200-06* 
* SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.33284500-07 * 
* COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION= 0.79013590-01 * 
* FIGURE OF MERIT = 0.23097900+10 * 
23 
24 
* TIME PER HISTORY = 0.1300725D-01 * 
**************************************************** 
CPU CALCULATION TIME: 0.5203E+03 SECONDS 
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=============================--========= 
MONTE CARLO UNRELIABILITY CALCULATION APPENDIX B.11 
===========~=========================== 
NUMBER OF COMPONENT GROUPS: 7 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP POWER_SUPPLY 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP POWER_SUPPLY 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT POWER_SUPPLY 
WEIBULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT POWER_SUPPLY 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT POWER_SUPPLY 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP POWER_SUPPLY 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP INPUT_CONT 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP INPUT_CONT 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT INPUT_CONT 
WE I BULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT INPUT_CONT 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT INPUT_CONT 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP INPUT_CONT 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP DATA_COLL 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP DATA_COLL 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT DATA_COLL 
WE I BULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT DATA_COLL 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT DATA_COLL 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP DATA_COLL 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP CPUs 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP CPUs 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT CPUs 
WEIBULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT CPUs 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT CPUs 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP CPUs 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP BUSSES 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP BUSSES 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT BUSSES 
WEIBULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT BUSSES 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT BUSSES 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP BUSSES 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP OUT_DRIVE 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP OUT_DRIVE 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT OUT DRIVE 
WEI BULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT OUT DRIVE 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT OUT-DRIVE 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP OUT_DRIVE 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP DATA RECVR 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP DATA RECv.R 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT DATA=RECVR 
WE I BULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT DATA RECVR 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT DATA-RECVR 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP DATA_RECVR 
3 
o 
0.3000D-04 
0.00000+00 
0.00000+00 
NONE 
3 
o 
0.1500D-04 
O.OOOOD+OO 
0.00000+00 
NONE 
2 
o 
0.7000D-05 
O.OOOOD+OO 
0.00000+00 
NONE 
3 
o 
0.3260D-04 
O.OOOOD+OO 
0.00000+00 
NONE 
3 
o 
0.1000D-04 
O.OOOOD+OO 
0.00000+00 
NONE 
3 
o 
0.3000D-05 
0.00000+00 
O.OOOOD+OO 
NONE 
3 
o 
0.4260D-05 
0.00000+00 
0.00000+00 
: NONE 
MISSION TIME FOR THIS MODEL: 
NUMBER OF MONTE CARLO HISTORIES: 
NEAR COINCIDENT FAULT MODEL: 
10.00 
40000 
4 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 1 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.1607696D-06 +/- 0.4634166D-08 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.8590198D-12 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.2882489D-01 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 2 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.7551111D-07 +/- 0.3207294D-08 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.4114694D-12 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.4247446D-01 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 3 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.3678941D-07 +/- 0.2235804D-08 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.1999528D-12 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.6077303D-01 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 4 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.2673268D-09 +/- 0.7314072D-11 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.2~39826D-17 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = O.2736004D-01 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 5 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.7679503D-10 +/- O.4012188D-11 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = O.6439060D-18 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = O.5224541D-01 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 6 
UNRELIABILITY = O.2136010D-10 +/- 0.2097490D-11 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.1759786D-18 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.9819667D-01 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 7 
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UNRELIABILITY = 0.24816960-10 +/- 0.20959930-11 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.17572750-18 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.84458090-01 
OVERALL UNRELIABILITY OUE TO EXHAUSTION OF HAROWARE 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.27346040-06 +/- 0.59761330-08 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.14285670-11 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.21853740-01 
UNRELIABILITY OUE TO SINGLE POINT FAILURE 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.00000000+00 +/- 0.00000000+00 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.00000000+00 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.00000000+00 
UNRELIABILITY OUE TO NEAR COINCIOENT FAULT 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.00000000+00 +/- 0.00000000+00 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.00000000+00 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.00000000+00 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO COMMON MODE FAILURE 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.00000000+00 +/- 0.00000000+00 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.00000000+00 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.00000000+00 
OVERALL SYSTEM CALCULATION: 
=========================== 
**************************************************** 
* UNRELIABILITY = 0.27346040-06 +/- 0.59761330-08* 
* SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.14285670-11 * 
* COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION= 0.21853740-01 * 
* FIGURE OF MERIT = 0.54174500+14 * 
* TIME PER HISTORY = 0.12921250-01 * 
**************************************************** 
CPU CALCULATION TIME: 0.5168E+03 SECONDS 
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======================================= 
MONTE CARLO UNRELIABILITY CALCULATION APPENDIX B.12 
======================================= 
NUMBER OF COMPONENT GROUPS: 7 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP POWER_SUPPLY 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP POWER_SUPPLY 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT POWER_SUPPLY 
WEIBULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT POWER_SUPPLY 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT POWER_SUPPLY 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP POWER_SUPPLY 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP INPUT_CONT 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP INPUT_CONT 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT INPUT_CONT 
WEIBULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT INPUT_CONT 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT INPUT_CONT 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP INPUT_CONT 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP DATA_COLL 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP DATA_COLL 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT DATA_COLL 
WEIBULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT DATA_COLL 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT DATA_COLL 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP DATA_COLL 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP CPUs 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP CPUs 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT CPUs 
WEIBULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT CPUs 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT CPUs 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP CPUs 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP BUSSES 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP BUSSES 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT BUSSES 
WE I BULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT BUSSES 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT BUSSES 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP BUSSES 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP OUT_DRIVE 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP OUT DRIVE 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT OUT-DRIVE 
WEIBULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT OUT DRIVE 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT OUT-DRIVE 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP OUT DRIVE 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP DATA RECVR 
NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP DATA_RECvR 
FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT DATA_RECVR 
WEIBULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT DATA RECVR 
SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT DATA-RECVR 
FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP DATA_RECVR 
: 
. 
. 
3 
2 
0.3000D-04 
O.OOOOD+OO 
O.OOOOD+OO 
NONE 
3 
o 
0.1500D-04 
O.OOOOD+OO 
O.OOOOD+OO 
NONE 
2 
o 
0.7000D-05 
0.00000+00 
O.OOOOD+OO 
NONE 
3 
o 
0.3260D-04 
0.00000+00 
O.OOOOD+OO 
NONE 
3 
o 
0.1000D-04 
0.00000+00 
O.OOOOD+OO 
NONE 
3 
o 
0.3000D-05 
O.OOOOD+OO 
0.00000+00 
NONE 
3 
o 
0.4260D-05 
O.OOOOD+OO 
0.00000+00 
: NONE 
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MISSION TIME FOR THIS MODEL: 
NUMBER OF MONTE CARLO HISTORIES: 
NEAR COINCIDENT FAULT MODEL: 
10.00 
40000 
4 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 1 
----------------------------------------------------
UNRELIABILITY = 0.1851200D-13 +/- 0.2509484D-14 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.2519004D-24 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.1355599D+00 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 2 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.3767722D-07 +/- 0.2326881D-08 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.2165750D-12 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.6175829D-01 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 3 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.1691256D-07 +/- 0.1530143D-08 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.9365352D-13 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.9047379D-01 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 4 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.1280122D-09 +/- 0.5206921D-11 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.1084481D-17 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.4067520D-01 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 5 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.3241568D-10 +/- 0.2544685D-11 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.2590168D-18 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.7850165D-01 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 6 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.6442319D-11 +/- 0.1077866D-11 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.4647177D-19 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.1673102D+OO 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP 7 
29 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.1157005D-10 +/- 0.1513996D-11 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.9168740D-19 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.1308547D+00 
OVERALL UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF HARDWARE 
UNRELIABILITY = 0.5476824D-07 +/- 0.2779101D-08 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.3089361D-12 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = 0.5074293D-01 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO SINGLE POINT FAILURE 
UNRELIABILITY = O.OOOOOOOD+OO +/- O.OOOOOOOD+OO 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = O.OOOOOOOD+OO 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = O.OOOOOOOD+OO 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO NEAR COINCIDENT FAULT 
UNRELIABILITY = O.OOOOOOOD+OO +/- O.OOOOOOOD+OO 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = O.OOOOOOOD+OO 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = O.OOOOOOOD+OO 
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO COMMON MODE FAILURE 
UNRELIABILITY = O.OOOOOOOD+OO +/- O.OOOOOOOD+OO 
SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.00000000+00 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION = O.OOOOOOOD+OO 
OVERALL SYSTEM CALCULATION: 
======================= 
**************************************************** 
* UNRELIABILITY = 0.5476824D-07 +/- 0.2779101D-08* 
* SAMPLE VARIANCE = 0.30893610-12 * 
* COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION= 0.5074293D-01 * 
* FIGURE OF MERIT = 0.2099916D+15 * 
* TIME PER HISTORY = 0.1541450D-01 * 
**************************************************** 
CPU CALCULATION TIME: 0.6166E+03 SECONDS 
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Appendix C 
Listing of Monte Carlo 
Unreliability Program 
This Page Intentionally left Blank 
------ -~ 
MCCODE.F Tuesday, October 16, 1990 1:17 pm 
C***********************************************************************c 
c* *c 
C* 
c* 
c* 
c* 
c* 
c* 
c* 
c* 
c* 
c* 
C* 
c* 
c* 
c* 
c* 
c* 
c* 
c* 
c* 
c* 
c* 
c* 
C* 
c* 
c* 
c* 
c* 
c* 
C* 
c* 
c* 
Subroutine MAINMC 
Abstract: 
MARVIN E. PLATT 
SUMMER 1990 
EARLIER VERSIONS BY: 
FRANZ BOEHM 
CHRISTOPH KIRSCH 
BARBARA KELKHOFF 
This subroutine is called from CFEHM whenever the 
user wants to perform a Monte Carlo calculation. 
Calling sequence: 
CALL MAINMC 
Subroutines called: 
INPUT 
NAMCC 
OUTPUT 
Functions called: 
Creates an input file for the 
Monte Carlo calculation, or 
reads the input from a previous 
file or edits a previous file. 
Performs the non-analog Monte Carlo 
simulation of system unreliability. 
Evaluates the unreliabilities (with the 
tallies from NAMCC) and writes the 
solution to an output file. 
None called. 
*c 
*C 
*c 
*C 
*C 
*C 
*c 
*c 
*C 
*c 
*C 
*C 
*C 
*C 
*C 
*C 
*C 
*C 
*c 
*C 
*C 
*C 
*C 
*C 
*C 
*C 
*C 
*c 
*C 
*C 
*C 
C***********************************************************************C 
C* 
C* 
C* 
C* 
C* 
C* 
C* 
SUBROUTINE MAINMC 
REAL TIMSET,TIMSTP,TARRY(2) 
PARAMETER (MD=20,IMD=300) 
CHARACTER*13 FHMNAM(MD),GRPNAM(MD) 
DOUBLE PRECISION FR,RM,ALPHA,ZETA,ETA,ANSW, 
* X,TALCC,TALSP,RTCMF,PV, 
* TALNC,TALCM,DL,TTAL 
DIMENSION NUMPV(MD),RTCMF(MD),TALCC(2,IMD),TALSP(2,IMD), 
* FR(MD),RM(3,MD),ALPHA(3,MD),TAL~C(~,IMD), 
* MCSNUM(MD),MCSET(3*IMD),NIG(IMD), 
* INCG(MD),TTAL(2,MD),TALCM(2,IMD), 
* ISPARO(MD),INCLSV(MD),PV(IMD),NXSTAT(IMD*MD) 
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C* 
C* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
C* 
c* 
C* 
C* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
C* 
c* 
c* 
C* 
* 
* 
C* 
200 
c* 
C 
Tuesday, October 16, 1990 1:17 pm 
DATA ZETA,ETA/1D-2,3DO/ 
OPEN (l,FILE='INPMC.DAT',STATUS='UNKNOWN') 
OPEN (2,FILE='OUTMC.DAT',STATUS='UNKNOWN') 
REWIND 1 
REWIND 2 
CALL INPUT(MD,IMD,NOCG,INCG,NOC,FR,RM,ALPHA, 
DL,NOH,NOTI,MCSNUM,MCSET,LMCS,IDIM, 
NEAR,NIG,ID,INCLSV,FHMNAM,ANSW,X, 
NCMF,NUMPV,RTCMF,IC,PV,NXSTAT, 
GRPNAM, ISPARO) 
Set CPU time 
TIMSET=DTIME(TARRY) 
CALL NAMCC(NOH,NOCG,INCG,NOC,NOTI,NEAR,ZETA,ETA, 
ANSW,X,DL,LMCS,IDIM,MCSNUM,MCSET,NIG,ID, 
INCLSV,FHMNAM,FR,RM,ALPHA,ISPARO, 
NCMF,NUMPV,RTCMF,IC,PV,NXSTAT, 
TALCC,TALSP,TALNC,TALCM,TTAL) 
Get CPU time 
TIMSTP=DTIME(TARRY) 
CALL OUTPUT(NOCG,INCG,FR,RM,ALPHA,RTCMF,DL,NOH, 
NCMF,NEAR,TALCC,TALSP,TALNC,TALCM,TTAL, 
TIMSTP,NOTI,ISPARO,FHMNAM,GRPNAM) 
WRITE(2,200) , CPU CALCULATION TIME:',TIMSTP,' SECONDS' 
FORMAT(lX//A,E13.4,A) 
CLOSE (1) 
CLOSE (2) 
RETURN 
END 
C* 
C*34567890l234567890l234567890l234567890l234567890l234567890123456789*C 
C* 
C* 
C* 
C* 
C* 
C* 
c* 
C* 
C* 
C* 
C* 
C* 
C* 
Subroutine NAMCC() 
Subroutine NAMCC performs the non-analog Monte Carlo 
unreliability simulation. The code allows for constant 
or time dependent (Weibull) component failure rates. 
In addition to the HARP coverage models, we implement 
the handling of common mode failures. component repair 
rates are not used, however spare components can be 
specified for each component group. Insertion of spares 
is equivalent to instantaneous repair and is consistent 
with the method of behavioral decomposition employed. 
*C 
*c 
*c 
*c 
*c 
*c 
*c 
*c 
*c 
*C 
*c 
*c 
*c 
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C* Input Parameters: *c 
c* NOH ... Number of Monte Carlo histories. *c 
c* NOCG .. Number of component groups. *C 
c* INCG .. Number of components in each group (initially). *c 
c* NOC ... Total number of components in the system model. *c 
c* NOT I Number of time intervals for graphing. *c 
c* NEAR .. Identifies the near coincident fault model. *c 
c* ZETA .. Lower parameter for case splitting. *c 
c* ETA ... Upper parameter for case splitting. *c 
c* ANSW .. Value for the "analog switch." *c 
c* X ..... Parameter for failure biasing. *c 
c* DL ...• Design life (mission time) for the system. *c 
c* LMCS .. Number of components in largest minimum cut set. *C 
c* IDIM .. Working dimension of array MCSET. *c 
c* MCSNUM. Number of singlets, doublets, ..• , (LMCS)-lets. *c 
c* MCSET .. Array containing the minimum cut sets. *c 
c* NIG ... Array for NCF user-defined interfering groups. *c 
c* ID .... Working dimension of array NIG. *c 
c* INCLSV. Set to 1 (from 0) for self-interfering groups. *c 
c* FHMNAM. Fault/error-handling model name for each group. *c 
c* FR •.•• Constant failure rate of group components. *c 
c* ALPHA .. Weibull failure rate coefs. (Oth-2nd derivatives). *c 
c* RM .••. Exp. power for Weibull rate (Oth-2nd derivatives). *c 
c* ISPARO. Number of spare components for each group. *c 
C* NCMF •• Number of specified common mode failure events. *C 
c* NUMPV .. Number of next state possibilities for CMF events. *c 
c* RTCMF.. Array of common mode failure rates. *C 
c* IC .... Working dimension of array PV. *c 
c* PV .... Array of next state probabilities for CMF events. *c 
c* NXSTAT. Array specifying next states for CMF events. *c 
c* Output Parameters: *c 
c* TALCC .. Unreliability tally for exhaustion of hardware. *c 
c* TALSP •. Unreliability tally for single point failure. *c 
c* TALNC •. Unreliability tally for near coincident faults. *C 
c* TALCM .. Unreliability tally for common mode failures. *c 
c* TTAL .. Unreliability tally for each component group. *c 
c* ----------------------------------------------------------------- *c 
C* 
C* 
C* 
SUBROUTINE NAMCC(NOH,NOCG,INCG,NOC,NOTI,NEAR,ZETA,ETA, 
* ANSW,X,DL,LMCS,IDIM,MCSNUM,MCSET,NIG,ID, 
* INCLSV,FHMNAM,FR,RM,ALPHA,ISPARO, 
* NCMF,NUMPV,RTCMF,IC,PV,NXSTAT, 
* TALCC, TALSP, TALNC, TALCM, TTAL) 
PARAMETER (MD=20,IMD=300) 
CHARACTER*13 FHMNAM(NOCG) 
LOGICAL YES,NO 
CHARACTER*3 CH 
DOUBLE PRECISION FR,RM,ALPHA,ZETA,ETA,ANSW,X, 
* TF,TALCC,TALSP,TALNC,TALCM, 
* TTAL,TIME,DL,TI,TIO 
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C* 
c* 
C* 
C* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
DOUBLE PRECISION TL,DT,W,NFRATE,WGAMO, 
NFRAT2,NFRAT3,R,S,N,C,GAMO, 
RN, TT , WI, SUMC , SUMN , SUMS , 
SUMNFR,PC,PN,PS,PST,PF,W2F, 
W2R,BPC,BPS,BPN,BPST,PCM,BPCM 
DOUBLE PRECISION SUM,FRTO,RTCMF,PV,SUMCMF, 
FRFUNC,RANl,CD,SD,RD,CC, 
RMl,RM2,RM3,CMl,CM2,CM3,SMl, 
SM2,SM3,RMOM,CMOM,SMOM 
DIMENSION MCSNUM(LMCS),MCSET(IDIM),FR(NOCG), 
RM(3,NOCG),ALPHA(3,NOCG),INCG(NOCG), 
TF(IMD),TI(IMD),NXSTAT(IC*NOCG),PV(IC), 
TIO(IMD),NIG(ID),ISOIC(IMD),NCIG(MD), 
CD(MD),SD(MD),RD(MD),CC(MD) 
DIMENSION RMOM(3,MD),CMOM(3,MD),SMOM(3,MD),SUMNFR(3,MD), 
* RTCMF(NCMF),TTAL(2,NOCG),TALCC(2,NOTI), 
* TALSP(2,NOTI),TALNC(2,NOTI),TALCM(2,NOTI), 
* NUMPV(NCMF),ISPAR(MD),ISPARO(NOCG),INCLSV(NOCG) 
OPEN (7,FILE='VALUES.DAT',STATUS='UNKNOWN') 
REWIND 7 
C* Initialize the calculation. 
c* Compute the unreliability at time intervals DT: 
c* 
DT=DL/DBLE (NOTI) 
DO 8 I=l,NOTI 
TALCC(l,I)=ODO 
TALCC(2,I)=ODO 
TALSP(l,I)=ODO 
TALSP(2,I)=ODO 
TALNC(l,I)=ODO 
TALNC(2,I)=ODO 
TALCM(l,I)=ODO 
TALCM(2,I)=ODO 
8 CONTINUE 
DO 13 I=l,NOCG 
TTAL(l,I)=ODO 
TTAL(2,I)=ODO 
13 CONTINUE 
C* 
NHF=O 
NHFS=O 
NHFN=O 
NHFCM=O 
C* Get the state independent values for the first three 
c* moments to exit (RMOM,CMOM,SMOM) as well as the state 
c* independent FEHM exit probabilities (RD,CD,SD): 
c* 
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4 PRINT* 
C* 
C* 
PRINT*,' DO YOU WANT TO USE FEHM EXIT' 
PRINT*,' PROBABILITIES AND MOMENTS FROM' 
PRINT*,' FILE VALUES.DAT (Y/N) l' 
READ*, CH 
YES= ( CH ( 1 : 1) • EQ. ' Y , ) . OR. (CH ( 1 : 1) • EQ. ' y' ) 
NO= ( CH ( 1 : 1) . EQ. ' N ' ) . OR. (CH ( 1 : 1) • EQ. ' n ' ) 
IF (NO) THEN 
DO 1 I=l,NOCG 
IF (FHMNAM(I).EQ.'NONE') THEN 
c* ---use perfect-coverage values---
SD(I)=ODO 
CD(I)=lDO 
RD(I)=ODO 
RMOM(l,I)=ODO 
RMOM(2,I)=ODO 
RMOM(3,I)=ODO 
CMOM(l,I)=ODO 
CMOM(2,I)=ODO 
CMOM(3,I)=ODO 
SMOM(l,I)=ODO 
SMOM(2,I)=ODO 
SMOM(3,I)=ODO 
ELSE 
c* ---fault/error-handling using the HARP code---
NFRATE=ODO 
C* 
C* 
c* 
NFRAT2=ODO 
CALL COVNOM(FHMNAM(I),NFRATE,NFRAT2,C,N, 
* S,R,RM1,RM2,RM3,CM1,CM2,CM3, 
* SM1,SM2,SM3) 
CD(I)=C 
SD(I)=S 
RD(I)=R 
RMOM(1,I)=RM1 
RMOM(2,I)=RM2 
RMOM(3,I)=RM3 
CMOM(l,I)=CMl 
CMOM(2,I)=CM2 
CMOM(3,I)=CM3 
SMOM(1,I)=SM1 
SMOM(2,I)=SM2 
SMOM(3,I)=SM3 
END IF 
Write these values on a file: 
WRITE(7,*) CD(I) 
WRITE(7,*) SD(I) 
WRITE(7,*) RD(I) 
WRITE(7,*) RMOM(l,I) 
WRITE(7,*) RMOM(2,I) 
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WRITE(7,*) RMOM(3,I) 
WRITE(7,*) CMOM(l,I) 
WRITE(7,*) CMOM(2,I) 
WRITE(7,*) CMOM(3,I) 
WRITE(7,*) SMOM(l,I) 
WRITE(7,*) SMOM(2,I) 
WRITE(7,*) SMOM(3,I) 
1 CONTINUE 
C* 
ELSE IF (YES) THEN 
C* 
C* Read the exit probabilities and moments from a file: 
c* 
DO 2 I=l,NOCG 
READ(7,*) CD(I) 
READ (7 , *) SD(I) 
READ (7 ,*) RD(I) 
READ(7,*) RMOM(l,I) 
READ(7,*) RMOM(2,I) 
READ(7,*) RMOM(3,I) 
READ(7,*) CMOM(l,I) 
READ(7,*) CMOM(2,I) 
READ(7,*) CMOM(3,I) 
READ(7,*) SMOM(l,I) 
READ(7,*) SMOM(2,I) 
READ(7,*) SMOM(3,I) 
2 CONTINUE 
C* 
C* 
C* 
C* 
ELSE 
GO TO 4 
END IF 
PRINT*,' SYSTEM MODEL COMPLETE.' 
PRINT*,' FAULT HANDLING TERMINATED.' 
PRINT* " MONTE CARLO CALCULATION BEGINS:' 
c* Sum the total transition rate due to common mode failure: 
c* 
SUMCMF=ODO 
DO 25 I=l,NCMF 
SUMCMF=SUMCMF+RTCMF(I) 
25 CONTINUE 
C* ---begin Monte Carlo simulation loop---
C* 
c* 
c* 
c* 
c* 
DO 10 I1=1,NOH 
Initialize a new history. 
Set the time, time left, trial weight, system state, and 
the number of operational and spaJ:e components per group: 
TIME=ODO 
TL=DL 
W=lDO 
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* 
* 
* 
Tuesday, October 16, 1990 1:17 pm 
ISYS=O 
DO 15 I=1,NOCG 
NCIG(I)=INCG(I) 
ISPAR(I)=ISPARO(I) 
CONTINUE 
Initialize the state of individual components as operational 
at time zero (TIO) and also initialize the time (TI) at which 
spare components are switched in as operational: 
DO 20 J=1,NOC 
ISOIC(J)=1 
TIO(J)=ODO 
TI(J)=ODO 
CONTINUE 
---NFC is a tally for the number of failed components---
NFC=O 
Non-analog Monte Carlo simulation: if you want to solve 
the system with analog Monte Carlo only, set IANAC=1. 
IANAC=O 
Initialization for history 11 completed. statement number 
999 is the entry point for simulating the next state 
transition of the Monte Carlo history: 
CONTINUE 
Calculate the total transition rate GAMO at the design 
life time DL (for self-transition sampling method [6]): 
---GAMO is a state-dependent but time-independent value---
CALL SETNFR(NOCG,INCG,NIG,ID,NOC,ISOIC, 
FR,ALPHA,RM,TIO,DL,SUMNFR) 
GAMO=SUMCMF 
K=O 
DO 35 I=1,NOCG 
DO 30 J=1,INCG(I) 
K=K+l 
IF (ISOIC(K).NE.O) THEN 
---component K is operational---
Get fault handling probability sum N+S+CC(K)=1-R. 
Only this fraction of the failure rate of component 
K contributes to the total transition rate "out" 
of the present system state. 
R=O~'J 
IF (NCIG(I) .GT. 1) THEN 
CALL NCFRT(FHMNAM(I),NEAR,INCLSV(I), 
FR(I),ALPHA,RM,I,TIO(K),DL,SUMNFR, 
NFRATE,NFRAT2,NFRAT3) 
39 
MCCODE.F 
C* 
c* 
30 
35 
c* 
c* 
c* 
c* 
C* 
C* 
c* 
c* 
C* 
c* 
c* 
c* 
C* 
* 
Tuesday, October 16, 1990 1:17 pm 
R=RD(I) * (lDO-NFRATE*RMOM(l,I) 
+NFRAT2*RMOM(2,I)-NFRAT3*RMOM(3,I» 
IF (R .GT. 1DO) R=lDO 
END IF 
---get failure rate of component K at time DL---
FRTO=FRFUNC(FR(I),ALPHA(l,I),RM(l,I),TIO(k),DL) 
---sum the total next state transition rate---
GAMO=GAMO+(lDO-R)*FRTO 
END IF 
CONTINUE 
CONTINUE 
Sample the time to the next transition TT. The sampling 
method switchs to analog exclusively after ANSW-
percent of the design life DL has been simulated. 
RN=RAN1(ISEED) 
CALL NXTIME(ETA,ZETA,IANAC,RN,TL,GAMO,W1,TT) 
IF (TIME .GT. (ANSW*DL» IANAC=l 
TIME=TIME+TT 
Terminate the history if there is no more time remaining: 
TL=TL-TT 
IF (TL .LE. ODO) GO TO 10 
40 
Calculate the probabilities of the transition being of type 
component failure PC, single point failure PS, near coincident 
fault PN, common mode failure PCM, or self-transition PST: 
CALL SETNFR(NOCG,INCG,NIG,ID,NOC,ISOIC, 
* FR,ALPHA,RM,TI,TIME,SUMNFR) 
C* 
c* 
c* 
c* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
SUMC=ODO 
SUMN=ODO 
SUMS=ODO 
K=O 
DO 45 I=l,NOCG 
DO 40 J=l,INCG(I) 
K=K+l 
IF (ISOIC(K).NE.O) THEN 
Get fault handling exits N, S, CC(K), R: 
---TIME-TI(K) is operational time of compo K---
IF (NCIG(I) .GT.1) THEN 
CALL NCFRT(FHMNAM(I),NEAR,INCLSV(I), 
FR(I),ALPHA,RM,I,TI(K),TIME,SUMNFR, 
NFRATE,NFRAT2,NFRAT3) 
R=RD(I) * (lDO-NFRATE*RMOM(l, I) 
+NFRAT2*RMOM(2,I)-N~RAT3*RMOM(3,I» 
CC(K)=CD(I) * (lDO-NFRATE*CMOM(l, I) 
+NFRAT2*CMOM(2,I)-NFRAT3*CMOM(3,I» 
S=SD(I) * (lDO-NFRATE*SMOM(l, I) 
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+NFRAT2*SMOM(2,I)-NFRAT3*SMOM(3,I» 
N=1DO-R-CC(K)-S 
IF (N .LT. 0) N=ODO 
ELSE 
N=ODO 
S=ODO 
CC(K)=1DO 
END IF 
---get the current failure rate of compo K---
TF(K)=FRFUNC(FR(I),ALPHA(1,I),RM(1,I),TI(K),TIME) 
---sum time-dependent next state transition rates 
for each exit type (permanent-coverage, near 
coincident fault, and single point failure---
SUMC=SUMC+TF(K)*CC(K) 
SUMN=SUMN+TF(K)*N 
SUMS=SUMS+TF(K)*S 
END IF 
CONTINUE 
CONTINUE 
---if only constant component rates are used GAMO is equal 
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to SUMC+SUMN+SUMS+SUMCMF and thus the probability for self-
transition PST is zero, otherwise GAMO is greater than 
SUMC+SUMN+SUMS+SUMCMF and self-transitions are probable---
PC=SUMC/GAMO 
PN=SUMN/GAMO 
PS=SUMS/GAMO 
PCM=SUMCMF/GAMO 
PF=PC+PN+PS+PCM 
PST=1DO-PF 
IF (PST .LE. 1D-30) PST=ODO 
Calculate the weights and biased probabilities of the 
transition being of type component failure BPC, single 
point failure BPS, near coincident fault BPN, self-
transition BPST, or common mode failure BPCM. 
IF «PF.GT.X).OR.(PF.LE.ID-30).OR.(IANAC.EQ.l» THEN 
---no failure biasing---
W2F=lDO 
W2R=1DO 
BPC=PC 
BPS=PS 
BPN=PN 
BPCM=PCM 
BPST=PST 
ELSE 
---bias the failure probability sum PF to equal X---
BPST=lDO-X 
W2R=PST/BPST 
W2F=PF/X 
BPN=PN/W2F 
BPS=PS/W2F 
BPC=PC/W2F 
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BPCM=PCM/W2F 
END IF 
Sample the type of the transition (component failure, 
single point failure, near coincident fault, self-
transition, or common mode failure): 
SUM=ODO 
WGAMO=GAMO*W2F 
RN=RAN1 (ISEED) 
IF (RN.LT.BPC) THEN 
Search for component failure transition: 
K=O 
DO 51 I=1,NOCG 
DO 50 J=1,INCG(I) 
K=K+1 
IF (ISOIC(K) .NE. 0) THEN 
SUM=SUM+TF(K)*CC(K)/WGAMO 
IF (RN .LT. SUM) THEN 
Failed component found--insert a spare 
component if available, else tag the 
component as failed: 
IF (ISPAR(I) .NE. 0) THEN 
ISPAR(I)=ISPAR(I)-1 
TI(K)=TIME 
ELSE 
NCIG(I)=NCIG(I)-1 
ISOIC(K)=O 
NFC=NFC+1 
END IF 
Weight history and check for system failure: 
W=W*W1*W2F 
ISYS=ISTATE (ISOIC,NOC,MCSNUM, LMCS, 
MCSET,IDIM,NFC) 
IF (ISYS .EQ. 1) THEN 
System failure: terminate history. 
compile tallies for each component group: 
TTAL(1,I)=TTAL(1,I)+W 
TTAL(2,I)=TTAL(2,I)+W*W 
Compile overall tallies for 
permanent-coverage exit: 
NHF=NHF+1 
42 
MCCODE.F 
C* 
C* 
50 
51 
C* 
C* 
C* 
C* 
C* 
C* 
C* 
C* 
C* 
C* 
C* 
C* 
C* 
Tuesday, October 16, 1990 1:17 pm 
M=INT(TIME/DT)+1 
TALCC(l,M)=TALCC(l,M)+W 
TALCC(2,M)=TALCC(2,M)+W*W 
---start a new history---
GO TO 10 
END IF 
---continue sampling---
GO TO 999 
END IF 
END IF 
CONTINUE 
CONTINUE 
END IF 
IF (RN .LT.(BPC+BPCM» THEN 
Search for common mode failure transition: 
SUM=BPC+RTCMF(l)/WGAMO 
I=l 
K=O 
DO WHILE (SUM .LE. RN) 
I=I+1 
SUM=SUM+RTCMF(I)/WGAMO 
K=K+NUMPV(I-1) 
END DO 
Common mode failure I found, search for the next state: 
RN=RAN1 (ISEED) 
SUM=ODO 
DO WHILE (SUM .LE. RN) 
K=K+1 
SUM=SUM+PV(K) 
END DO 
Next state K for CMF event I found. 
Fail components corresponding to this state: 
KN=(K-1)*NOCG 
K=O 
DO 65 I=l,NOCG 
KN=KN+1 
M=O 
MO=NXSTAT(KN) 
---negative value implies random generated case---
IF (MO .LT. 0) MO=INT(RAN1(ISEED)*ABS(MO»+1 
DO 60 J=l,INCG(I) 
K=K+l 
IF (M .GE. MO) GO TO 60 
IF (ISOIC(K) .NE. 0) THEN 
---tag components as failed---
M=M+1 
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NCIG(I)=NCIG(I)-l 
ISOIC(K)=O 
NFC=NFC+1 
END IF 
CONTINUE 
CONTINUE 
Weight history and check for system failure: 
W=W*W1*W2F 
ISYS=ISTATE(ISOIC,NOC,MCSNUM,LMCS,MCSET,IDIM,NFC) 
IF (ISYS .EQ. 1) THEN 
M=INT(TIME/DT)+1 
TALCM(l,M) =TALCM(l,M) +W 
TALCM(2,M)=TALCM(2,M)+W*W 
NHFCM=NHFCM+1 
---start a new history---
GO TO 10 
END IF 
---continue sampling---
GO TO 999 
END IF 
IF (RN .LT. (BPC+BPCM+BPS» THEN 
Transition is of type single point failure, 
therefore: system failed, terminate history. 
W=W*W1*W2F 
NHFS=NHFS+1 
M=INT(TIME/DT)+1 
TALSP(l,M) =TALSP(l,M) +W 
TALSP(2,M)=TALSP(2,M)+W*W 
---start a new history---
GO TO 10 
END IF 
IF (RN .LT.(BPC+BPCM+BPS+BPN» THEN 
Transition is of type near coincident fault, 
therefore: system failed, terminate history. 
W=W*W1*W2F 
NHFN=NHFN+1 
M=INT(TIME/DT)+1 
TALNC(l,M)=TALNC(l,M)+W 
TALNC(2,M)=TALNC(2,M)+W*W 
---start a new history---
G,) TO 10 
END IF 
Else transition is of type self-transition, advance in time: 
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W=W*Wl*W2R 
c* ---continue sampling---
GO TO 999 
c* 
10 CONTINUE 
c* 
W=DBLE(NHF+NHFS+NHFN+NHFCM)/DBLE(NOH) 
print*, 'percent of history failures: ',W*lD2 
CLOSE (7) 
c* ---end Monte Carlo simulation, return to MAINMC---
RETURN 
END 
C*3456789012345678901234567890l2345678901234567890l234567890123456789*C 
c* *C 
c* Subroutine NXTIME() *c 
c* *c 
C* 
c* 
c* 
c* 
c* 
c* 
c* 
c* 
c* 
c* 
c* 
c* 
c* 
c* 
This subroutine samples the time to the next state 
transition. Analog sampling is used if ANALOG=l, otherwise 
the case splitting method is used [1]. 
Input Parameters: 
ETA ••. Upper parameter for case splitting. 
ZETA •• Lower parameter for case splitting. 
ANALOG. Switch for analog/non-analog sampling. 
RN •••• Random number between 0 and 1. 
TL .••• Simulation time left. 
GAMO .• CUrrent total state transition rate. 
Output Parameters: 
WT Trial weight correction for non-analog sampling. 
DT •••• The time to the next state transition. 
*C 
*c 
*c 
*c 
*c 
*c 
*c 
*c 
*c 
*c 
*c 
*c 
*c 
*c 
C* *c 
c* ----------------------------------------------------------------- *c 
SUBROUTINE NXTIME(ETA,ZETA,ANALOG,RN,TL,GAMO,WT,DT) 
INTEGER ANALOG 
DOUBLE PRECISION ETA,ZETA,RN,TL,GAMO,WT,DT,ENOT 
C* ENOT is the expected number of transitions in the remaining time. 
C* 
ENOT=TL*GAMO 
IF «ENOT .GT. ETA) .OR. (ANALOG .EQ. 1» THEN 
C* ---use analog sampling---
WT=l.O 
DT=-DLOG(RN)/GAMO 
ELSE IF (ENOT • LE. ZETA) THEN 
c* ---use rare event non-analog sampling---
WT=ENOT 
ELSE 
C* 
DT=TL*RN 
---use non-analog sampling---
WT=l.O-DEXP(-ENOT) 
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DT=-DLOG(1.0-WT*RN)/GAMO 
END IF 
RETURN 
END 
C*3456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789*C 
C* *C 
C* 
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Subroutine SETNFR() 
This subroutine computes intermediate near coincident 
fault rate values for each component group. Subroutine 
NCFRT then uses these intermediate values to update the 
current near coincident fault rate for each component. 
Input parameters: 
NOCG .• Number of component groups. 
INCG .• Initial no. of components in each group. 
NIG ••. Array of NCF user-defined interfering groups. 
ID ...• Working dimension of array NIG. 
NOC •.• Total number of system components. 
ISOIC .. The state of individual components (0 or 1). 
FR ...• Constant failure rate of group components. 
*C 
*c 
*c 
*c 
*c 
*c 
*c 
*c 
*c 
*C 
*c 
*C 
*c 
*C 
*c 
ALPHA •• Weibull failure rate coefs. (Oth-2nd derivatives). *C 
RM •••• Exp. power for Weibull rate (Oth-2nd derivatives). *c 
TO •••• Time at which each component became operational. *c 
TIME .• Current model simulation time. 
Output parameter: 
SUMNFR. Sum of intermediate NCF rates for each group. 
(Oth-2nd derivatives) 
SUBROUTINE SETNFR(NOCG,INOC,NIG,ID,NOC,ISOIC, 
* FR,ALPHA,RM,TO,TIME,SUMNFR) 
INTEGER NOCG,INOC(NOCG),NIG(ID),ISOIC(NOC) 
DOUBLE PRECISION FRFUNC,FR,ALPHA,RM,TO,TIME,SUMNFR 
DIMENSION FR(NOCG),ALPHA(3,NOCG),RM(3,NOCG), 
* SUMNFR(3,NOCG),TO(NOC) 
NSUM=O 
DO 40 N=l,NOCG 
NSTART=NOCG+NSUM+l 
NSTOP=NSTART+NIG(N)-l 
SUMNFR(l,N)=ODO 
SUMNFR(2,N)=ODO 
SUMNFR(3,N)=ODO 
Jl=l 
K=O 
DO 30 I=NSTART,NSTOP 
J2=NIG(I) 
DO 10 J=Jl,J2-1 
*C 
*c 
46 
MCCODE.F 
10 
C* 
* 
* 
* 
Tuesday, October 16, 1990 1:17 pm 
K=K+INOC(J) 
CONTINUE 
DO 20 J=1,INOC(J2) 
K=K+1 
IF (ISOIC(K) .NE. 0) THEN 
---Oth,lst, and 2nd derivative sums---
SUMNFR(1,N)=SUMNFR(1,N)+FRFUNC(FR(J2), 
ALPHA(1,J2),RM(1,J2),TO(K),TIME) 
SUMNFR(2,N) =SUMNFR(2,N) +FRFUNC(ODO, 
ALPHA(2,J2),RM(2,J2),TO(K),TIME) 
SUMNFR(3,N)=SUMNFR(3,N)+FRFUNC(ODO, 
ALPHA(3,J2),RM(3,J2),TO(K),TIME) 
END IF 
20 CONTINUE 
J1=J2+1 
30 CONTINUE 
NSUM=NSUM+NIG(N) 
40 CONTINUE 
RETURN 
END 
C*3456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789*C 
C* *C 
C* Subroutine NCFRT ( ) *c 
c* *c 
c* This subroutine uses the sum totals computed by subroutine *c 
c* SETNFR to quickly update the near coincident fault rate for *c 
c* a component from group I. The new fault rate value is used *c 
c* to compute the Taylor series coefficients needed for *c 
c* computing the state-dependent FEHM exit probabilities. *c 
c* *c 
C* Input Parameters: *C 
c* FHMNAM. Fault/error-handling model name for group I. *c 
c* NEAR .• Identifies the near coincident fault model. *c 
c* INCLSV. Set to 1 (from 0) for self-interfering groups. *c 
c* FRI •.• Failure rate of components belonging to group I. *c 
c* ALPHA .. Weibull failure rate coefs. (oth-2nd derivatives). *c 
c* RM ••.. Exp. power for Weibull rate (Oth-2nd derivatives). *c 
C* I ••.•. The component group presently under consideration. *c 
c* TO ...• Time a particular grp. I compo became operational. *c 
c* TIME •• Current model simulation time. *c 
c* TOTFR •. Sums computed by subroutine SETNFR. *c 
c* Output Parameters: *c 
c* NFRT1 .. Coefficient of first moment to exit. *c 
c* NFRT2 .. Coefflcient of second moment to exit. *c 
c* NFRT3 .. Coefficient of third moment to exit. *c 
c* *c 
c* ----------------------------------------------------------------- *c 
SUBROUTINE NCFRT(FHMNAM,NEAR,INCLSV,FRI,ALPHA,RM,I, 
* TO,TIME,TOTFR,NFRT1,NFRT2,NFRT3) 
CHARACTER*13 FHMNAM 
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DOUBLE PRECISION FRI,ALPHA,RM,TO,TIME,TOTFR,GAMMA, 
* GAMMP,GAMPP,NFRT1,NFRT2,NFRT3,FRFUNC 
DIMENSION ALPHA(3,NOCG),RM(3,NOCG),TOTFR(3,NOCG) 
C* GAMMA,GAMMP,GAMMPP: Oth,lst & 2nd transition rate derivatives--
IF «FHMNAM .EQ. 'NONE') .OR. (NEAR .EQ. 4» THEN 
c* ---no near coincident fau1ts---
GAMMA=ODO 
GAMMP=ODO 
GAMPP=ODO 
ELSE IF (INCLSV .EQ. 0) THEN 
C* ---no update is necessary---
GAMMA=TOTFR(l,I) 
GAMMP=TOTFR(2,I) 
GAMPP=TOTFR(3,I) 
ELSE 
c* ---subtract component rate from the total for group I---
GAMMA=TOTFR(l,I)-FRFUNC(FRI,ALPHA(l,I),RM(l,I),TO,TIME) 
GAMMP=TOTFR(2,I)-FRFUNC(ODO,ALPHA(2,I),RM(2,I),TO,TIME) 
GAMPP=TOTFR(3,I)-FRFUNC(ODO,ALPHA(3,I),RM(3,I),TO,TIME) 
END IF 
NFRT1=GAMMA 
NFRT2=GAMMA**2/2DO-GAMMP 
NFRT3=GAMMA*(GAMMA**2/6DO-GAMMP)+GAMPP/2DO 
RETURN 
END 
C*3456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789*C 
c* *c 
c* Function FRFUNC() *c 
c* *c 
c* This function returns the value of a component failure rate *c 
c* at the current time or returns the 1st or 2nd derivative of *c 
c* the Weibull component failure rate at the current time. *c 
c* *c 
c* Input Parameters: *C 
c* LAMO .. A constant component failure rate. *C 
c* ALPHA .• Coefficient for Weibull rate (Oth,lst,or 2nd derv.)*C 
c* RM ..•. Exp. power for Weibull rate (Oth,lst,or 2nd derv.).*C 
c* TO .••. Time when a component became operational. *c 
c* TIME .• CUrrent model simulation time. *c 
c* *c 
c* ----------------------------------------------------------------- *c 
FUNCTION FRFUNC(LAMO,ALPHA,RM,TO,TIME) 
DOUBLE PRECISION FRFUNC,LAMO,ALPHA,RM,TO,TIME 
IF (ALPHA .EQ. ODO) THEN 
c* ---constant component failure rate---
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FRFUN C=LAM 0 
ELSE 
c* ---Weibull failure rate or 1st or 2nd derivative---
FRFUNC=LAMO+ALPHA*(TIME-TO)**RM 
END IF 
RETURN 
END 
C*3456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789*C 
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Function ISTATE() 
This function compares the current system state with the 
minimum cut sets to determine the state of the system: 
ISTATE=O (operational) or ISTATE=l (failed). 
Input Parameters: 
ISOIC •• The current state of individual components. 
NOC ... The total number of system components. 
MCSNUM. Number of singlets, doublets, ••. , (LMCS)-lets. 
LMCS .• No. of components in the largest minimum cut set. 
MCSET •. Array containing the minimum cut sets. 
IDIM •• Working dimension of array MCSET. 
NFC ••• The total number of components currently failed. 
FUNCTION ISTATE(ISOIC,NOC,MCSNUM,LMCS,MCSET,IDIM,NFC) 
DIMENSION MCSNUM(LMCS),MCSET(IDIM),ISOIC(NOC) 
ISTATE=O 
J=l 
N1=LMCS 
IF (NFC .LT. N1) N1=NFC 
DO 10 N=1,N1 
DO 20 I2=1,MCSNUM(N) 
K=O 
DO 30 I3=1,N 
IF (ISOIC(MCSET(J».EQ.O) K=K+l 
J=J+1 
30 CONTINUE 
IF (K.EQ.N) THEN 
ISTATE=l 
GO TO 99 
END IF 
20 CONTINUE 
10 CCNTIh'"UE 
99 RETURN 
END 
C*3456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789*C 
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C* 
C* Subroutine DTOUT() 
C* 
C* This subroutine modifies the unreliability tallies due to 
c* hardware exhaustion, single point failure, near coincident 
c* fault, and common mode failure for discrete time steps. 
c* Data results for the total system unreliability U (plus or 
c* minus standard deviation) as a function of time is written 
c* to a file named OUTGR.DAT. 
c* 
c* Input Parameters: 
c* NOH ••• Number of Monte Carlo histories. 
c* NOTI •• Number of time intervals for graphing. 
c* DL ••.• The design life of the system model. 
c* Input/Output parameters: 
c* TALCC •• Unreliability tally due to hardware exhaustion. 
c* TALSP •• Unreliability tally due to single point failure. 
c* TALNC .. Unreliability tally due to near coincident faults. 
c* TALCM •• Unreliability tally due to common mode failure. 
c* 
c* -----------------------------------------------------------------
C* 
C* 
C* 
C* 
c* 
SUBROUTINE DTOUT(NOH,NOTI,DL,TALCC,TALSP,TALNC,TALCM) 
DOUBLE PRECISION TALCC,TALSP,TALNC,TALCM,DL,DT, 
* U,SD,VAR,TALLY,TALY2,T,RNOH 
DIMENSION TALCC(2,NOTI),TALSP(2,NOTI), 
* TALNC(2,NOTI),TALCM(2,NOTI) 
OPEN (3,FILE='OUTGR.DAT',STATUS='UNKNOWN') 
REWIND 3 
RNOH=DBLE(NOH) 
DT=DL/DBLE (NOTI) 
TALLY=ODO 
TALY2=ODO 
DO 10 I=l,NOTI 
TALLY=TALLY+TALCC(l,I) 
TALY2=TALY2+TALCC(2,I) 
TALCC(l,I)=TALLY 
TALCC(2,I)=TALY2 
10 CONTINUE 
TALLY=ODO 
TALY2=ODO 
DO 20 I=l,NOTI 
TALLY=TALLY+TALSP(l,I) 
TALY2=TALY2+TALSP(2,I) 
TALSP(l,I)=TALLY 
TALSP(2,I)=TALY2 
20 CONTINUE 
TALLY=ODO 
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TALY2=ODO 
DO 30 I=l,NOTI 
TALLY=TALLY+TALNC(l,I) 
TALY2=TALY2+TALNC(2,I) 
TALNC(l,I)=TALLY 
TALNC(2,I)=TALY2 
30 CONTINUE 
TALLY=ODO 
TALY2=ODO 
DO 40 I=l,NOTI 
TALLY=TALLY+TALCM(l,I) 
TALY2=TALY2+TALCM(2,I) 
TALCM(l,I)=TALLY 
TALCM(2,I)=TALY2 
40 CONTINUE 
WRITE (3,200) 
WRITE(3,100) 0.,0.,0.,0. 
DO 60 I=l,NOTI 
U=(TALCC(l,I)+TALSP(l,I)+TALNC(l,I)+TALCM(l,I»/RNOH 
VAR=(TALCC(2,I)+TALSP(2,I)+TALNC(2,I)+TALCM(2,I»/RNOH-U*U 
SD=DSQRT(VAR/RNOH) 
T=I*DT 
WRITE(3,100) T,U,U+SD,U-SD 
60 CONTINUE 
C* 
100 
200 
C * 
FORMAT (4(2X,E14.7» 
FORMAT (7X,'TIME',8X,'UNRELIABILITY',3X,' 
3X,' -SD ',II) 
CLOSE(3) 
RETURN 
END 
+SD , 
C*3456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789*C 
c* 
c* Function RAN1() 
c* 
c* This function returns a random number between 0 and 1. 
c* The SUN FORTRAN random number generator DRAND is used. 
c* The number of seconds since midnight is used to start the 
c* random number generator. From then on the seed is equal to 
c* zero and the next random number in sequence is returned. 
C* 
C* Input/Output Parameter: 
C 
C* SEED •. The seed for the random number generator. 
C* 
C* -----------------------------------------------------------------
C* 
FUNCTION RAN1(SEED) 
INTEGER IARRY(3),SEED,SET 
DOUBLE PRECISION DRAND,RAN1 
*C 
*C 
*c 
*c 
*c 
*c 
*c 
*C 
*C 
*C 
*c 
*C 
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DATA SET / 1 / 
SEED=O 
TUesday, October 16, 1990 1:17 pm 
IF (SET .EQ. 1) THEN 
c* ---start with SUN FORTRAN time converted to seconds---
CALL ITIME (lARRY) 
SEED=IARRY(1)*3600+IARRY(2)*60+IARRY(3) 
SET=O 
END IF 
RAN1=DRAND(SEED) 
RETURN 
END 
C*345678901234567890l2345678901234567890l234567890l234567890123456789*C 
c* *c 
c* Subroutine INPUT() *c 
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c* *c _ 
C* 
c* 
c* 
This subroutine creates an input file for the Monte Carlo 
unreliability calculation, or reads the input from 
from a previous file (INPMC.DAT) or modifies this file. 
*C 
*c 
*c 
C* *c 
c* Input Parameters: *c 
c* MD ••.• Dimension constant for max. no. of compo groups. *c 
c* IMD ••• Dimension constant for max. no. of components. *c 
c* Output Parameters: *c 
c* NOCG •. Number of component groups. *C 
C* NCIG .. Number of components in each group. *C 
C* NOC .•• Total number of components in the system model. *c 
c* FR •••• Constant failure rate of group components. *c 
c* RM •••• Exp. power for Weibull rate (oth-2nd derivatives). *c 
c* ALPHA •• Weibull failure rate coefs. (Oth-2nd derivatives). *c 
c* DL •.•• Design life for the system. *c 
c* NOH .•. Number of Monte Carlo histories. *c 
c* NOTI •. Number of time intervals for graphing. *c 
c* MCSNUM. Number of singlets, doublets, ... ,(LMCS)-lets. *c 
c* MCSET .. Array containing the minimum cut sets. *C 
c* LMCS Number of components in largest minimum cut set. *C 
C* IDIM .. Working dimension of array MCSET. *c 
c* NEAR •• Identifies the near coincident fault model. *c 
c* NIG ..• Array for NCF user-defined interfering groups. *c 
c* ID ..•• Working dimension of array NIG. *c 
c* INCLSV. Set to 1 (from 0) for self-interfering groups. *c 
c* FHMNAM. Fault/error-handling model name for each group. *c 
c* ANSW •. Value for the "analog switch." *c 
c* X .••.• Parameter for failure biasing. *c 
c* NCMF .• Number of specified common mode failure events. *C 
C* NUMPV .. Number of next state possibilities for CMF events. *c 
c* RTCMF .. Array of common mode failure rates. *C 
C* IC ...• Working dimension of array PV. *c 
c* PV ..•. Array of next state probabilities for CMF events. *C 
c* NXSTAT. Array specifying next states for CMF events. *c 
c* GRPNAM. Name of each component group. *C 
C* ISPARO. Number of spare components for each group. *c 
c* *C 
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C* ----------------------------------------------------------------- *C 
SUBROUTINE INPUT(MD,IMD,NOCG,NCIG,NOC,FR,RM,ALPHA, 
* DL,NOH,NOTI,MCSNUM,MCSET,LMCS,IDIM, 
* NEAR,NIG,ID,INCLSV,FHMNAM,ANSW,X, 
* NCMF,NUMPV,RTCMF,IC,PV,NXSTAT, 
* GRPNAM, ISPARO) 
C* 
CHARACTER*13 FHMNAM(MD) ,GRPNAM(MD) 
C* 
DOUBLE PRECISION FR,RM,ALPHA,DL,ANSW,X,RTCMF,PV,THETA,WM 
C* 
DIMENSION NIG(IMD),FR(MD),RM(3,MD),INCLSV(MD),ISPARO(MD), 
* ALPHA(3,MD),MCSNUM(MD),MCSET(3*IMD),NCIG(MD), 
* NUMPV(MD) ,RTCMF(MD) ,PV(IMD) ,NXSTAT(IMD*MD) 
C* 
1 PRINT * 
C* 
C* 
C* 
C* 
c* 
C* 
C* 
C* 
C* 
C* 
C* 
PRINT*,' THE MONTE CARLO INPUT FILE IS INPMC.DAT --' 
PRINT* " DO YOU WANT TO:' 
PRINT* " 1) INPUT A NEW SYSTEM MODEL:' 
PRINT* " 2) EDIT THE OLD INPUT FILE:' 
PRINT* " 3) USE THE INPUT FILE AS IS ?' 
READ*,NCHOSE 
IF (NCHOSE .EQ. 1) THEN 
CALL INPGRP(MD,IMD,NOCG,NCIG,NOC,ISPARO,GRPNAM, 
* FR, ALPHA, RM, FHMNAM) 
CALL INPMCS(MD,IMD,NOCG,LMCS,MCSNUM,MCSET) 
CALL INPNCF(MD,IMD,NOCG,NEAR,ID,NIG,INCLSV) 
CALL INPCMF(MD,IMD,NOCG,NCIG,FR,ALPHA,NCMF,RTCMF,NUMPV, 
* IC,PV,NXSTAT) 
PRINT*,' INPUT THE DESIGN LIFE FOR THIS SYSTEM:' 
READ*,DL 
PRINT* " INPUT NO. OF TIME INTERVALS FOR GRAPHING' 
READ*,NOTI 
IF (NOTI .LT. 1) NOTI=l 
IF (NOTI .GT. IMD) NOTI=IMD 
PRINT*,' HOW MANY HISTORIES DO YOU WANT TO USE' 
PRINT* " FOR THE MONTE CARLO SIMULATION ?' 
READ*,NOH 
CALL DEFVAL(ANSW.X) 
ELSE IF «NCHOSE .EQ. 2) .OR. (NCHOSE .EQ. 3» THEN 
C* Read the input from the previous input file: 
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C* 
READ(l,*) NOCG 
NOC=O 
DO 260 J=l,NOCG 
READ (1,*) NCIG(J) 
NOC=NOC+NCIG(J) 
READ (1,*) ISPARO(J) 
READ (1, *) GRPNAM(J) 
READ (1, *) FR(J) 
READ (1,*) WM 
READ (1, *) THETA 
c* WM,THETA==> Weibul1 modulus and scale parameter. 
IF (THETA .EQ. ODO) THEN 
RM(l,J)=ODO 
RM(2,J)=ODO 
RM(3,J)=ODO 
ALPHA(l,J)=ODO 
ALPHA(2,J)=ODO 
ALPHA(3,J)=ODO 
ELSE 
RM(1,J)=WM-1DO 
RM(2,J)=WM-2DO 
RM(3,J)=WM-3DO 
ALPHA(l,J)=WM/THETA**WM 
ALPHA(2,J)=ALPHA(1,J)*RM(1,J) 
ALPHA(3,J)=ALPHA(2,J)*RM(2,J) 
END IF 
READ(l, *) FHMNAM(J) 
260 CONTINUE 
READ(l,*) DL 
READ(l,*) NOT I 
READ(l,*) NOH 
READ (1, *) ANSW 
READ(l, *) X 
READ (1, *) LMCS 
IDIM=O 
DO 270 J=l,LMCS 
READ(l,*) MCSNUM(J) 
IDIM=IDIM+MCSNUM(J)*J 
270 CONTINUE 
N1=1 
N2=0 
DO 280 I=l,LMCS 
DO 275 J=l,MCSNUM(I) 
N2=N2+I 
READ(l,*) (MCSET(N),N=Nl,N2) 
N1=N2+1 
275 CONTINUE 
280 CONTINUE 
READ (1, *) NEAR 
ID=NOCG 
DO 290 I=l,NOCG 
READ(l,*) NIG(I) 
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290 CONTINUE 
DO 300 I=l,NOCG 
INCLSV(I) =0 
DO 295 J=l,NIG(I) 
ID=ID+1 
READ(l,*) NIG(ID) 
IF (NIG(ID) .EQ. I) INCLSV(I)=l 
295 CONTINUE 
300 CONTINUE 
IC=O 
READ(l,*) NCMF 
DO 320 I=l,NCMF 
READ(l,*) RTCMF(I) 
READ(l,*) NUMPV(I) 
DO 310 J=l,NUMPV(I) 
IC=IC+1 
N2=IC*NOCG 
N1=N2-NOCG+1 
READ(l,*) PV(IC) 
READ(l,*) (NXSTAT(KN), KN=N1,N2) 
310 CONTINUE 
320 CONTINUE 
C* 
C* 
ELSE 
GO TO 1 
END IF 
IF (NCHOSE .EQ. 2) THEN 
10 PRINT*,' SELECT AN EDITING OPTION:' 
PRINT * 
PRINT*,' 1) EDIT COMPONENT GROUP SPECIFICATIONS;' 
PRINT*,' 2) EDIT MINIMUM CUT SET SPECIFICATIONS;' 
PRINT*,' 3) EDIT THE NEAR COINCIDENT FAULT MODEL;' 
PRINT*,' 4) EDIT THE COMMON MODE FAILURE MODEL;' 
PRINT* " 5) CHANGE THE DESIGN LIFE (MISSION) TIME;' 
PRINT*,' 6) CHANGE NO. OF TIME INTERVALS FOR GRAPHING;' 
PRINT*,' 7) CHANGE NUMBER OF MONTE CARLO HISTORIES;' 
PRINT*,' 8) CHANGE THE NON-ANALOG DEFAULT VALUES;' 
PRINT* " 9) QUIT EDITING / RUN MONTE CARLO SIMULATION.' 
READ* ,NOM 
IF (NOM .EQ. 1) THEN 
CALL INPGRP(MD,IMD,NOCG,NCIG,NOC,ISPARO,GRPNAM, 
* FR, ALPHA, RM, FHMNAM) 
ELSE IF (NOM .EQ. 2) THEN 
CALL INPMCS(MD,IMD,NOCG,LMCS,MCSNOM,MCSET) 
ELSE IF (NOM .EQ. 3) THEN 
CALL INPNCF(MD,IMD,NOCG,NEAR,ID,NIG,INCLSV) 
ELSE IF (NOM .EQ. 4) THEN 
CALL INPCMF(MD,IMD,NOCG,NCIG,FR,ALPHA,NCMF,RTCMF,NUMPV, 
* IC,PV,NXSTAT) 
ELSE IF (NOM • EQ. 5) THEN 
PRINT*,' INPUT THE DESIGN LIFE FOR THIS SYSTEM:' 
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C* 
READ*,DL 
ELSE IF (NUM .EQ. 6) THEN 
PRINT*,' INPUT NO. OF TIME INTERVALS FOR GRAPHING' 
READ*,NOTI 
IF (NOTI .LT. 1) NOTI=l 
IF (NOTI .GT. IMD) NOTI=IMD 
ELSE IF (NUM .EQ. 7) THEN 
PRINT* " HOW MANY HISTORIES DO YOU WANT TO USE' 
PRINT* " FOR THE MONTE CARLO SIMULATION ?' 
READ*,NOH 
ELSE IF (NUM • EQ • 8) THEN 
CALL DEFVAL(ANSW,X) 
END IF 
IF (NUM .NE. 9) GO TO 10 
END IF 
IF (NCHOSE .NE. 3) THEN 
C* Rewrite the input file: 
C* 
REWIND 1 
WRITE(l,*) NOCG 
DO 180 I=l,NOCG 
WRITE(l,*) NCIG(I) 
WRITE(l,*) ISPARO(I) 
WRITE(l,*) GRPNAM(I) 
WRITE(l,*) FR(I) 
IF (ALPHA (1, I) .EQ. ODO) THEN 
WM=ODO 
ELSE 
THETA=ODO 
WRITE (1, *) WM 
WRITE{l,*) THETA 
WM=RM(l,I)+lDO 
WRITE ( 1, *) WM 
THETA=(WM/ALPHA(l,I»**(lDO/WM) 
WRITE ( 1 , *) THETA 
END IF 
WRITE(l,*) FHMNAM(I) 
180 CONTINUE 
WRITE(l,*) DL 
WRITE(l,*) NOT I 
WRITE(l,*) NOH 
WRITE (1, *) ANSW 
WRITE(l,*) X 
WRITE ( 1, *) LMCS 
DO 185 I=l,LMCS 
WRITE(l,*) MCSNUM(I) 
185 CONTINUE 
N1=1 
N2=0 
DO 200 I=l,LMCS 
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DO 190 J=l,MCSNUM(I) 
N2=N2+I 
WRITE(l,*) (MCSET(N),N=Nl,N2) 
Nl=N2+1 
190 CONTINUE 
200 CONTINUE 
WRITE (1, *) NEAR 
DO 210 I=l,ID 
WRITE (1,*) NIG(I) 
210 CONTINUE 
K=O 
WRITE(l,*) NCMF 
DO 240 I=l,NCMF 
WRITE (1, *) RTCMF(I) 
WRITE(l,*) NUMPV(I) 
DO 230 J=l,NUMPV(I) 
K=K+l 
N2=K*NOCG 
Nl=N2-NOCG+l 
WRITE(l,*) PV(K) 
WRITE(l,*) (NXSTAT(KN),KN=Nl,N2) 
230 CONTINUE 
240 CONTINUE 
c* 
END IF 
RETURN 
END 
C*3456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789*C 
c* *c 
c* Subroutine INPGRP() *c 
c* *c 
C* 
c* 
c* 
c* 
c* 
c* 
c* 
c* 
c* 
This subroutine asks the user to input: 
NOCG •• Number of component groups; 
NCIG •• Number of components in each group; 
ISPARO. Number of spare components for each group; 
GRPNAM. Name of each component group; 
FR ••.• Constant failure rates of group components; 
WM •••• Weibull modulus for each group; 
THETA •• Weibull scale parameter for each group; 
FHMNAM. Fault/error-handling model name for each group. 
*C 
*c 
*c 
*c 
*c 
*c 
*C 
*c 
*c 
C* *c 
c* For groups with constant component failure rates, the *c 
c* Weibull modulus and scale parameter should be input as zero. *c 
c* ALPHA stores the component Weibull failure rate coefficients *c 
c* as well as the coefficients for the 1st and 2nd derivatives. *C 
c* RM stores the required exponential powers needed for the *c 
c* Weibull failure rates and the 1st and 2nd derivatives. *c 
c* NOC is a tally for the total number of system components. *c 
c* *c 
c* ----------------------------------------------------------------- *c 
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SUBROUTINE INPGRP(MD,IMD,NOCG,NCIG,NOC,ISPARO,GRPNAM,FR, 
* ALPHA, RM, FHMNAM) 
C* 
CHARACTER*13 FHMNAM(MD),GRPNAM(MD) 
C* 
DOUBLE PRECISION FR,ALPHA,RM,THETA,WM 
DIMENSION NCIG(MD),ISPARO(MD),FR(MD),ALPHA(3,MD),RM(3,MD) 
C* 
GO TO 10 
5 PRINT* " NUMBER OF COMPONENT GROUPS SHOULD BE' 
PRINT* " LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO', MD 
10 PRINT* " HOW MANY COMPONENT GROUPS DOES YOUR SYSTEM HAVE?' 
READ*,NOCG 
IF (NOCG .GT. MD) GO TO 5 
K=O 
DO 20 I=l,NOCG 
PRINT 1000, I 
READ*,NCIG(I) 
K=K+NCIG(I) 
PRINT 1005,I 
READ *,ISPARO(I) 
PRINT 1010,I 
READ ' (A) , , GRPNAM (I) 
PRINT 1100, I 
READ *, FR(I) 
PRINT 1300, I 
PRINT* " (INPUT ZERO FOR CONSTANT RATES)' 
READ *,WM 
PRINT lS00,I 
pRINT*,' (INPUT ZERO FOR CONSTANT RATES)' 
READ *, THETA 
IF (THETA .EQ. 000) THEN 
RM(l,I)=ODO 
RM(2,I)=ODO 
RM(3,I)=ODO 
ALPHA(l,I)=ODO 
ALPHA(2,I)=ODO 
ALPHA(3,I)=ODO 
ELSE 
RM(1,I)=WM-1DO 
RM(2,I)=WM-2DO 
RM(3,I)=WM-3DO 
ALPHA(l,I)=WM/THETA**WM 
ALPHA(2,I)=ALPHA(1,I)*RM(1,I) 
ALPHA(3,I)=ALPHA(2,I)*RM(2,I) 
END IF 
PRINT 1600,I 
READ '(A}',FHMNAM(I) 
20 CONTINUE 
NOC=K 
IF (NOC .GT. IMD) THEN 
PRINT*,'MAXIMUM NUMBER OF COMPONENTS SHOULD BE',IMD 
GO TO 10 
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1800 
Tuesday, october ~6, ~990 ~:~7 pm 
END IF 
FORMAT(' ENTER NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP',I2) 
FORMAT (' ENTER NUMBER OF SPARE COMPONENTS' I , 
, AVAILABLE FOR COMPONENT GROUP',I2) 
FORMAT (' ENTER NAME OF COMPONENT GROUP', I2 ) 
FORMAT (' ENTER FAILURE RATE OF COMPONENT IN GROUP', I2 ) 
FORMAT(' ENTER WEIBULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT GROUP',I2) 
FORMAT (' ENTER SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT GROUP', I2) 
FORMAT(' ENTER FAULT HANDLING MODEL NAME FOR GROUP',I2,'--'I, 
, USE THE NAME YOU CHOSE FOR THE FEHM FILE FOR THIS',I, 
, GROUP OR ENTER "NONE" (MUST BE CAPITAL LETTERS)', I , 
, IF YOU WANT NO FAILURE HANDLING FOR THIS GROUP.') 
FORMAT (A) 
RETURN 
END 
C*3456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789*C 
C* *C 
C* Subroutine INPMCS() *c 
c* *c 
c* This subroutine asks the user to input the required minimum *c 
c* cut sets for the system being modeled. *c 
c* *c 
c* Input Parameters: *c 
c* MD ••.• Dimension constant for array MCSNUM. *c 
c* IMD .•• (*3) Dimension constant for array MCSET. *c 
c* NOCG •• Number of component groups. *C 
C* Output Parameters: *C 
C* LMCS •• Number of components in largest minimum cut set. *C 
C* MCSNUM. Number of singlets, doublets, ••. , (LMCS)-lets. *c 
c* MCSET •• Array storing the minimum cut sets. *c 
c* *c 
c* ----------------------------------------------------------------- *c 
SUBROUTINE INPMCS(MD,IMD,NOCG,LMCS,MCSNUM,MCSET) 
DIMENSION MCSNUM(MD),MCSET(3*IMD) 
5 PRINT* " NOW INPUT THE MINIMUM CUT SETS FOR THIS' 
PRINT* ,'SYSTEM. HOW MANY COMPONENTS ARE THERE ' 
PRINT*,' IN THE LARGEST MINIMUM CUT SET? ' 
READ* ,LMCS 
IF (LMCS .GT. MD) THEN 
PRINT* " LARGEST CUT SET SHOULD BE NO MORE THAN', MD 
GO TO 5 
END IF 
IDIM=O 
DO 10 I=l,LMCS 
PRINT*,' HOW MANY CUT SETS HAVE:',I,' COMPONENT(S)?' 
READ~,MCSNUM(I) 
IDIM=IDIM+MCSNUM(I)*I 
10 CONTINUE 
IF (IDIM .GT. 3*IMD) THEN 
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PRINT*,' ***DIMENSION FOR ARRAY MCSET TO SMALL***' 
PRINT* " EITHER STOP AND INCREASE THE DIMENSION CONSTANT' 
PRINT* " OR OMIT SOME OF THE LARGER CUT SETS.' 
GO TO 5 
END IF 
PRINT* " NUMBER THE SYSTEM COMPONENTS SEQUENTIALLY' 
PRINT*,' BEGINNING WITH COMPONENT NUMBER 1 IN GROUP l' 
PRINT* " THROUGH TO THE LAST COMPONENT IN GROUP' I NOCG 
PRINT * 
PRINT* " ENTER ONE CUT SET AT A TIME BY LISTING THE' 
PRINT* " NUMBERS OF THE COMPONENTS IN THE SET SEPARATED' 
PRINT* " BY COMMAS OR SPACES. INPUT SINGLET SETS FIRST,' 
PRINT* " THEN DOUBLETS, AND SO ON UP TO THE LARGEST SET.' 
PRINT* " FOR EXAMPLE, A SYSTEM WITH NO SINGLETS, TWO' 
PRINT* " DOUBLETS, AND ONE TRIPLET WOULD BE ENTERED AS:' 
PRINT* " ,#, '# '# '#' 
PRINT*,' #,# (OR) # #' 
PRINT*,' #,#,# # # #' 
PRINT*,' NOW BEGIN TO ENTER THE CUT SETS:' 
N1=1 
N2=0 
DO 30 I=l,LMCS 
DO 20 J=l,MCSNUM(I) 
N2=N2+I 
READ*, (MCSET(N),N=N1,N2) 
N1=N2+1 
20 CONTINUE 
30 CONTINUE 
RETURN 
END 
C*3456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789*C 
C* 
c* 
c* 
C* 
c* 
Subroutine INPNCF() 
This subroutine asks the user to specify a near coincident 
fault model. 
*C 
*c 
*c 
*c 
*c 
C* *c 
c* Input Parameters: *c 
c* MD •••. Dimension constant for array INCLSV. *c 
c* IMD ••• Dimension constant for array NIG. *c 
c* NOCG •• Number of component groups. *C 
C* Output Parameters: *C 
C* NEAR •• Identifies the selected NCF model. *c 
c* ID .•.• Working dimension of array NIG. *c 
c* NIG(l:NOCG). Stores the total number of interfering groups *c 
c* for each of the component groups. *c 
c* NIG(NOCG+1:ID). Stores the group number(s) of all inter- *C 
c* fering group(s) for each of the component groups. *c 
c* INCLSV. Set to 1 (from 0) for self-interfering groups. *c 
c* *c 
c* ----------------------------------------------------------------- *c 
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SUBROUTINE INPNCF(MD,IMD,NOCG,NEAR,ID,NIG,INCLSV) 
LOGICAL YES,NO 
CHARACTER*3 ANSR 
DIMENSION NIG(IMD),INCLSV(MD) 
5 PRINT*,' CHOSE A NEAR COINCIDENT FAULT MODEL:' 
PRINT*,' 1) ALL INCLUSIVE NCF"S' 
C* 
PRINT*,' 2) SAME COMPONENT NCF"S' 
PRINT*,' 3) USER DEFINED NCF"S' 
PRINT*,' 4) NO NCF"S ALLOWED' 
READ*, NEAR 
K=NOCG 
IF (NEAR .EQ. 1) THEN 
DO 20 I=l,NOCG 
NIG(I)=NOCG 
DO 10 J=l,NOCG 
K=K+1 
NIG(K)=J 
10 CONTINUE 
INCLSV(I)=1 
20 CONTINUE 
ELSE IF (NEAR .EQ. 2) THEN 
DO 30 I=l,NOCG 
NIG(I)=l 
K=K+1 
NIG(K)=I 
INCLSV(I) =1 
30 CONTINUE 
ELSE IF (NEAR .EQ. 3) THEN 
PRINT*,' ***USER DEFINED NEAR COINCIDENT FAULT MODEL***' 
DO 50 I=l,NOCG 
NIG(I)=O 
INCLSV(I)=0 
PRINT*,' ARE NCF"S BETWEEN A COMPONENT FROM:' 
DO 40 J=l,NOCG 
35 PRINT 200,I,J 
READ*,ANSR 
YES=(ANSR(l:l).EQ.'Y').OR.(ANSR(l:l).EQ.'y') 
NO=(ANSR(l:l).EQ.'N').OR.(ANSR(l:l).EQ.'n') 
IF (YES) THEN 
NIG(I)=NIG(I)+l 
K=K+1 
NIG(K)=J 
IF (I .EQ. J) INCLSV(I)=l 
ELSE 
IF (.NOT.(NO» GO TO 35 
END IF 
40 CONTINUE 
50 CONTINUE 
ELSE IF (NEAR .EQ. 4) THEN 
DO 60 I=l,NOCG 
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NIG(I)=O 
INCLSV(I) =0 
60 CONTINUE 
ELSE 
GO TO 5 
END IF 
ID=K 
200 FORMAT(' GRP.',I2,' AND THEN GRP.',I2,' FATAL (YIN)?') 
RETURN 
END 
C*3456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789*C 
c* *C 
c* Subroutine INPCMF() *c 
c* *c 
c* This subroutine allows the user to specify common mode *c 
c* failure events which have constant rates. *c 
c* *c 
c* Input Parameters: *c 
c* MD .... Dimension constant for array RTCMF and NUMPV. *c 
c* IMD ... Dimension constant for array PV and (*MD) NXSTAT. *c 
c* NOCG .. Number of component groups. *c 
C* NCIG .. Number of components in each group. *c 
c* ALPHA •. Coefficients for Weibull component failure rates. *c 
c* Output Parameters: *c 
c* NCMF .• Number of specified common mode failure events. *C 
C* RTCMF .. Common mode failure rate for each event. *C 
C* NUMPV •. Number of next state possibilities for each event. *C 
C* IC ...• Working dimension of array PV. *c 
c* PV .... Next state probability vector for each event. *C 
C* NXSTAT. stores next state possibilities for each event. *C 
C* *C 
C* ----------------------------------------------------------------- *C 
C 
C 
C 
SUBROUTINE INPCMF(MD, IMD,NOCG,NCIG, FR,ALPHA,NCMF,RTCMF,NUMPV, 
* IC,PV,NXSTAT) 
DOUBLE PRECISION FR,ALPHA,RTCMF,PV,BETA,SUM 
DIMENSION NCIG(NOCG),FR(NOCG),ALPHA(3,NOCG),RTCMF(MD), 
* NUMPV(MD),PV(IMD),NXSTAT(IMD*MD) 
, 
PRINT*,' HOW MANY CMF EVENTS DO YOU WISH TO SPECIFY?' 
READ * , NCMF 
K=O 
KN=O 
DO 70 I=1,NCMF 
10 PRINT*,' CHOOSE MODEL FOR CMF EVENT',I 
PRINT*,' 1) BETA-FACTOR 
PRINT*,' 2) RANDOM GENERATED' 
PRINT*,' 3) USER DEFINED ' 
PRINT*,' 4) SYSTEM FAILURE ' 
READ * , ICMF 
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IF (ICMF .EQ. 1) THEN 
PRINT*,' BETA-FACTOR MODEL: SELECT COMPo GRP. NUMBER' 
READ*,NUM 
IF «NUM .LT. 1) .OR. (NUM .GT. NOCG» GO TO 20 
IF (ALPHA(l,NUM) .EQ. 0) THEN 
PRINT*,' THE COMPONENT FAILURE RATE IS',FR(NUM) 
PRINT*,' WHAT FRACTION BETA IS DUE TO CMF ?' 
REAO*,BETA 
IF «BETA .LT. 0) .OR. (BETA .GT. 100» GO TO 30 
RTCMF (I) =BETA*FR(NUM) 
FR(NUM)=FR(NUM)-RTCMF(I) 
ELSE 
PRINT*,' IN ADDITION TO THE WEIBULL FAILURE RATE,' 
PRINT*,' ESTIMATE A CONSTANT CMF RATE FOR THIS GROUP' 
READ*,RTCMF(I) 
END IF 
NUMPV(I) =1 
K=K+1 
PV(K)=lDO 
DO 40 N=l,NOCG 
KN=KN+1 
---next state ==> all group NUM components fail---
IF (N .EQ. NUM) THEN 
NXSTAT(KN)=NCIG(NUM) 
ELSE 
NXSTAT(KN)=0 
END IF 
CONTINUE 
ELSE IF (ICMF .EQ. 2) THEN 
PRINT*,' INPUT THE CONSTANT CMF RATE FOR THIS EVENT' 
READ*, RTCMF (I) 
NUMPV(I) =1 
K=K+1 
PV(K)=lDO 
PRINT*,' DUE TO THIS EVENT, INPUT THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF:' 
DO 50 N=l,NOCG 
KN=KN+1 
PRINT*,' GROUP',N,' COMPONENTS WHICH FAIL' 
READ*,NUM 
---next state is randomly determined: 
if NUM > 0, between 1 and NUM grp. N comps. fail---
NXSTAT(KN)=-NUM 
CONTINUE 
ELSE IF (ICMF . EQ. 3) THEN 
PRINT*,' INPUT THE CONSTANT CMF RATE FOR THIS EVENT' 
RE'\D*,RTCMF(I) 
PRINT*,' HOW MANY NEXT STATE POSSIBILITIES DO YOU WISH TO' 
PRINT*,' SPECIFY FOR THIS CMF EVENT ?' 
READ*,NUMPV(I) 
SUM=O 
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K1=K+1 
DO 60 J=l,NUMPV(I) 
K=K+1 
PRINT*,' ENTER PROBABILITY FOR NEXT STATE',J 
READ* , PV (K) 
PRINT*,' IN TRANSITION TO THIS STATE---' 
DO 55 N=l,NOCG 
KN=KN+1 
PRINT*,' HOW MANY GROUP',N,' COMPONENTS FAIL ?' 
READ*, NXSTAT (KN) 
CONTINUE 
SUM=SUM+PV(K) 
CONTINUE 
---normalize probabilities to sum to one---
DO 65 J=Kl,K 
PV(J)=PV(J)/SUM 
CONTINUE 
ELSE IF (ICMF .EQ. 4) THEN 
PRINT*,' INPUT THE CONSTANT CMF RATE FOR THIS EVENT' 
READ*,RTCMF(I) 
NUMPV(I) =1 
K=K+l 
PV(K) =100 
C ---next state==> all comps. fail==> system failure: 
DO 67 N=l,NOCG 
KN=KN+l 
NXSTAT(KN)=NCIG(N) 
67 CONTINUE 
ELSE 
GO TO 10 
END IF 
70 CONTINUE 
IC=K 
RETURN 
END 
C*34567890l234567890l234567890l234567890l234567890l234567890123456789*C 
C* *C 
C* Subroutine DEFVAL ( ) *c 
c* *c 
c* This subroutine sets the so-called analog switch ANSW and *c 
c* the parameter X for failure biasing. The sampling of times *c 
c* to the next state transition switches to analog exclusively *c 
c* after ANSW-percent of the mission time has been simulated. *c 
c* The default is ANSW=0.9 (90 percent). Failure biasing only *c 
c* is significant when time dependent rates are being used. *c 
C* The default is X=0.5 which is likely to be sufficient for *c 
c* all cases in which time dependent rates are used. *c 
c* ----------------------------------------------------------------- *c 
SUBROUTINE DEFVAL(ANSW,X) 
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DOUBLE PRECISION ANSW,X 
LOGICAL YES,NO 
CHARACTER*3 CHANGE 
ANSW=9D-1 
X=5D-1 
10 PRINT*,' CHANGE NON-ANALOG DEFAULT VALUES (YIN) ?' 
READ*, CHANGE 
YES=(CHANGE(l:l).EQ.'Y').OR.(CHANGE(l:l).EQ.'y') 
NO=(CHANGE(l:l).EQ.'N').OR.(CHANGE(l:l).EQ.'n') 
IF (YES) THEN 
20 PRINT*,' ENTER VALUE FOR ANALOG SWITCH (DEFAULT=0.9)' 
READ*, ANSW 
IF ((ANSW .LT. 0) .OR. (ANSW .GT. 1» THEN 
PRINT*,' CHOOSE A VALUE BETWEEN 0 AND l' 
GO TO 20 
END IF 
30 PRINT*,' ENTER VALUE FOR FAILURE BIASING (DEFAULT=0.5)' 
READ*, X 
IF «(X .LT. 0.05) .OR. (X .GT. 0.95» THEN 
PRINT*,' CHOOSE A VALUE BETWEEN 0.05 AND 0.95' 
GO TO 30 
END IF 
ELSE 
IF (.NOT.(NO» GO TO 10 
END IF 
RETURN 
END 
C*345678901234567890l234567890l234567890l234567890l234567890123456789*C 
c* 
c* 
c* 
c* 
C* 
Subroutine OUTPUT() 
This subroutine writes the results of the Monte Carlo 
unreliability calculation to file OUTMC.DAT. 
*c 
*c 
*c 
*c 
*c 
c* *c 
c* Input Parameters: *c 
c* NOCG .• Number of component groups. *c 
c* INCG •• Number of components in each group (initially). *c 
c* FR •••. Constant failure rates of group components. *c 
c* RM •••. Exp. powers needed for Weibull rates. *c 
C* ALPHA •• Coefficients for Weibull component failure rates. *c 
c* RTCMF •• Common mode failure event rates. *c 
c* DL ••.• Design life for the system model. *c 
C* NOH .•. Number of Monte Carlo histories used. *c 
c* NCMF ••• Number of specified common mode failure events. *C 
c* NEAR •. Identifies the near coincident fault model. *c 
c* TALCC •• Unreliability tally due to hardware exhaustion. *c 
c* TALSP .• Unreliability tally due to single point failure. *c 
c* TALNC .• Unreliability tally due to near coincident faults. *c 
c* TALCM .• Unreliability tally due to common mode failure. *c 
c* TTAL .. Unreliability tally due to each component group. *c 
c* TlME2 •• CPU time for the unreliability calculation. *c 
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NOTI •. Number of time intervals for graphing. 
ISPARO. Number of spare components for each group. 
FHMNAM. Fault/error-handling model name for each group. 
GRPNAM. The name specified for each component group. 
*C 
*C 
*c 
*c 
*c 
C* ----------------------------------------------------------------- *c 
SUBROUTINE OUTPUT(NOCG,INCG,FR,RM,ALPHA,RTCMF,DL,NOH, 
* NCMF,NEAR,TALCC,TALSP,TALNC,TALCM,TTAL, 
* TIME2,NOTI,ISPARO,FHMNAM,GRPNAM) 
C* 
PARAMETER (MD=20) 
C* 
CHARACTER*13 FHMNAM(NOCG),GRPNAM(NOCG),A*14 
C* 
DOUBLE PRECISION FR,RM,ALPHA,DL,TIME,TALCC, 
* TALSP,TALNC,TALCM,TTAL, 
* TPH,TALLY,TALY2,RNOH, 
* U1,VAR1,Sl,DELTA1,U2,VAR2, 
* S2,DELTA2,U3,VAR3,S3,DELTA3, 
* U4,VAR4,S4,DELTA4,RTCMF, 
* UT,VART,ST,DELTAT,U,VAR, 
* SD,DELTA,FOM,WM,THETA 
C* 
DIMENSION INCG(NOCG),FR(NOCG),RM(3,NOCG),ALPHA(3,NOCG), 
* TTAL(2,NOCG),UT(MD),VART(MD),TALLY(4),TALY2(4), 
* ST(MD),DELTAT(MD),ISPARO(NOCG),RTCMF(NCMF), 
* TALCC(2,NOTI),TALSP(2,NOTI),TALNC(2,NOTI), 
* TALCM(2,NOTI) 
C* 
c* Print header and system parameters: 
c* 
WRITE (2,295) 
WRITE (2, 1000) NOCG 
DO 10 I=l,NOCG 
WRITE (2, 1005) GRPNAM(I),INCG(I) 
WRITE(2,1007) GRPNAM(I),ISPARO(I) 
WRITE(2,1010) GRPNAM(I),FR(I) 
IF (ALPHA(l,I) .EQ. ODO) THEN 
WM=ODO 
THETA=ODO 
WRITE (2,1030) GRPNAM(I),WM 
WRITE (2,1050) GRPNAM(I),THETA 
ELSE 
WM=RM(l,I)+lDO 
WRITE (2,1030) GRPNAM(I),WM 
THETA=(WM/ALPHA(l,I»**(lDO/WM) 
WRITE (2,1050) GRPNAM(I),THETA 
END IF 
WRITE(2,1060) GRPNAM(I),FHMNAM(I) 
10 CONTINUE 
DO 15 J=l,NCMF 
WRITE(2,1070) J,RTCMF(J) 
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15 CONTINUE 
WRITE (2, 1120) DL,NOH,NEAR 
C* 
C* Evaluate the unreliability tallies: 
C* 
C* 
TIME=DBLE(TIME2) 
RNOH=DBLE(NOH) 
TPH=TIME/RNOH 
A='UNRELIABILITY' 
DO 20 J=l,NOCG 
IF (TTAL(l,J) .GT. ODO) THEN 
UT(J)=TTAL(l,J)/RNOH 
VART(J)=TTAL(2,J)/RNOH-UT(J)*UT(J) 
ST(J)=DSQRT(VART(J)/RNOH) 
DELTAT(J)=ST(J)/UT(J) 
END IF 
20 CONTINUE 
C* 
C* 
C* 
C* 
C* 
CALL DTOUT(NOH,NOTI,DL,TALCC,TALSP,TALNC,TALCM) 
TALLY (l)=TALCC(l,NOTI) 
TALY2(1)=TALCC(2,NOTI) 
IF (TALLY (1) .GT. ODO) THEN 
U1=TALLY(1)/RNOH 
VAR1=TALY2(1)/RNOH-U1*Ul 
Sl=DSQRT(VAR1/RNOH) 
DELTA1=Sl/U1 
END IF 
TALLY (2) =TALSP(l,NOTI) 
TALY2(2)=TALSP(2,NOTI) 
IF (TALLY (2) .GT. ODO) THEN 
U2=TALLY(2)/RNOH 
VAR2=TALY2(2)/RNOH-U2*U2 
S2=DSQRT(VAR2/RNOH) 
DELTA2=S2/U2 
END IF 
TALLY (3) =TALNC (l,NOTI) 
TALY2(3)=TALNC(2,NOTI) 
IF (TALLY (3) .GT. ODO) THEN 
U3=TALLY(3)/RNOH 
VAR3 =TALY 2 (3)/RNOH-U3*U3 
S3=DSQRT(VAR3/RNOH) 
DELTA3=S3/U3 
END IF 
TALLY(4)=TALCM(1,NOTI) 
TALY2(4)=TALCM(2,NOTI) 
IF (TALLY (4) .GT. ODO) THEN 
U4=TALLY(4)/RNOH 
VAR4=TALY2(4)/RNOH-U4*U4 
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C* 
C* 
S4=DSQRT(VAR4/RNOH) 
DELTA4=S4/U4 
END IF 
U=U1+U2+U3+U4 
VAR=(TALY2(1)+TALY2(2)+TALY2(3)+TALY2(4»/RNOH-U*U 
SD=DSQRT(VAR/RNOH) 
IF (SD .LT. 1D-30) THEN 
FOM=ODO 
E~E 
FOM=lDO/(VAR*TPH) 
END IF 
DELTA=SD/U 
C* write the Monte Carlo solution: 
C* 
DO 30 K=l,NOCG 
WRITE (2,297) K,A,UT(K),ST(K),VART(K),DELTAT(K) 
30 CONTINUE 
C* 
WRITE (2,300) A,U1,Sl,VAR1,DELTA1 
WRITE (2,301) A,U2,S2,VAR2,DELTA2 
WRITE (2,302) A,U3,S3,VAR3,DELTA3 
WRITE (2,303) A,U4,S4,VAR4,DELTA4 
WRITE (2,304) U,SD,VAR,DELTA,FOM,TPH 
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c* 
295 FORMAT (lX,/, 
* '=======================================',/, 
* , MONTE CARLO UNRELIABILITY CALCULATION',/, 
* '=======================================',//) 
C* 
297 FORMAT (lX,/, 
* ' UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF COMPONENT GROUP',I2,/, 
* , ----------------------------------------------------', /, 
* 1X,A14,' = ',D14.7,' +/- ',D14.7,/, 
* , SAMPLE VARIANCE = ',D14.7,/, 
* , COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION =',D14.7,//) 
C* 
300 FORMAT (lX,/, 
* , OVERALL UNRELIABILITY DUE TO EXHAUSTION OF HARDWARE',/, 
* , ---------------------------------------------------',/, 
* 1X,A14,' = ',D14.7,' +/- ',D14.7,/, 
* , SAMPLE VARIANCE = ',D14.7,/, 
* , COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION =',D14.7,//) 
C* 
301 FORMAT (lX,/, 
* , UNRELIABILITY DUE TO SINGLE POINT FAILURE',/, 
* , -----------------------------------------',//, 
* 1X,A14,' = ',D14.7,' +/- ',D14.7,/, 
* , SAMPLE VARIANCE = ',D14.7,/, 
* , COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION =',D14.7,//) 
C* 
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302 FORMAT (lX,/, 
* , UNRELIABILITY OUE TO NEAR COINCIOENT FAULT',/, 
* , -----------------------------------------',//, 
* 1X,A14,' = ',014.7,' +/- ',014.7,/, 
* , SAMPLE VARIANCE = ',014.7,/, 
* , COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION =',014.7,//) 
C* 
303 FORMAT (lX,/, 
* , UNRELIABILITY OUE TO COMMON MOOE FAILURE',/, 
* , -----------------------------------------',//, 
* 1X,A14,' = ',014.7,' +/- ',014.7,/, 
* , SAMPLE VARIANCE = ',014.7,/, 
* , COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION =',014.7,//) 
C* 
304 FORMAT (lX,/, 
C* 
1000 
1005 
1007 
1010 
1030 
1050 
1060 
1070 
1120 
C* 
* , OVERALL SYSTEM CALCULATION: ',/, 
* , ===========================',//, 
* , ****************************************************',/, 
* , * UNRELIABILITY = ',014.7,' +/-',014.7,'*',/, 
* , * SAMPLE VARIANCE = ',014.7,9X,' *',/, 
* , * COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION=',014.7,9X,' *',/, 
* , * FIGURE OF MERIT = ',014.7,9X,' *',/, 
* , * TIME PER HISTORY = ',014.7,9X,' *',/, 
* , ****************************************************') 
* 
* 
FORMAT (' NUMBER OF COMPONENT GROUPS: ',12,/) 
FORMAT (' NUMBER OF COMPONENTS IN GROUP ',A,': ',12) 
FORMAT (' NUMBER OF SPARES FOR GROUP ',A,' , ,12) 
FORMAT (' FAILURE RATE FOR COMPONENT ',A,' , ,011. 4) 
FORMAT (' WE I BULL MODULUS FOR COMPONENT ',A,': ',011.4) 
FORMAT (' SCALE PARAMETER FOR COMPONENT ',A,': ',011.4) 
FORMAT (' FAILURE HANDLING MODEL FOR GROUP ',A,': ',A13,/) 
FORMAT (' TRANSITION RATE FOR CMF EVENT', 12 , , : ' ,018.4) 
FORMAT (' MISSION TIME FOR THIS MOOEL: ',G11.4,/, 
, NUMBER OF MONTE CARLO HISTORIES: ',16,/, 
, NEAR COINCIOENT FAULT MOOEL: ',12,/) 
RETURN 
ENO 
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ABSTRACT 
A Monte Carlo methodology for the 
reliability slmulation of highly redundant 
systems is presented. Two forms of 
imponance sampling, forced transitions and 
failure biasing, allow large sets of 
continuous-time Markov equauoDs to be 
simulated effecuvely and the results to be 
plotted as continuous functlons of time. A 
modlfication of the sampling technique also 
allows the simulation of both 
nonhomogeneous Markov processes and of 
nonMarkovian processes involving the 
replacement of worn parts. A number of 
benchmark problems are examined. For 
problems with large numbers of components, 
Monte Carlo is found to result in decreases 
in computing times by as much as a factor of 
twenty from the Runge-Kutta Markov solver 
employed in the NASA code HARP. 
1. D.7RODUCfION 
There is an increasing need to predict 
mission unrellability and related parameters 
for systems exhibiting very low rates of 
failure. Typically, such systems are 
deSIgned in configurations with many 
component redundancies and are organized 
in such a manner that there are component 
dependencles in the forms of standby 
subsystems. shared-load components, and 
shared repair or fault handllng faculties. The 
utility of probabilistic analysis based on 
combinatorial techniques may be extremely 
limited. In contrast, such systems may often 
be modeled as continuous-time Markov 
processes, panicularly if the models are 
generahzable to include nonhomogeneous 
Markov processes. 
While Markov processes may be an 
excellent modeling tool, difficulties arise in 
carrying out computations, particularly in 
models that are too large or complex to treat 
by conventional analytical means. As n, the 
number of components, increase the 2n 
explosion of states means that very large 
systems of coupled differential equations 
must be solved. Moreover, these equations 
tend to be very stiff since the time constants 
involved may range from fault occurrences 
that are rare events even over weeks or 
months to fault handling mechanisms that 
lake place in small fractions of a second. As 
a result, the number of distinct components 
that can be treated is severely restricted if 
deterministic methods are employed. H the 
time constants fall into two widely 
separated time domains, behavioral 
decomposition (Bavuso, et al .• 1987) may be 
employed to treat the shon time constant 
events as instantaneous changes of state. 
But difficulties may then arise when there is 
inadequate separation in the magnitudes of 
the time constants. 
We have found that Monte Carlo 
methods may be an effectIve tool for treaung 
the sImulanon of systems having hIghly 
redundant configuratIons of components 
(LewIs and Boehm, 1984; LewIs and Tu, 
1986; Boehm, et al., 1988). Regardless of 
whether component dependencies are 
present, modelIng the system as a 
contInuous-ume Markov process allows the 
average number of event samplings reqUIred 
per mal to be reduced to only shghtly more 
than one. More imponant, however, is the 
use of a form of Imponance samplmg that we 
refer to as forced translUons, to ensure that 
a substantIal fraction of the mdependent 
mals will conmbute to the tally of the 
system unreliabIlIty. Monte Carlo analysIs 
may be further refined WIth a second form of 
Imponance samplmg, referred to as failure 
blasmg, that has the potential for eliminanng 
the approxImauons inherent In behaVIOral 
decomposlUon. Finally, Monte Carlo tallies 
may be constructed to YIeld more than the 
tradinonal single answer results; talhes of 
relIabIlity or other quantitIes of interest may 
be generated as continuous functions of time 
to prOVIde more physical insight Into the 
meaning of the results. 
2. MOr\TE CARLO FORMULATION 
For purposes of the Monte Carlo 
SImulatIon the nonhomogeneous Markov 
equauons are converted to semI-Markov 
equations. If Pk (t) represents the 
probability that the system is in state k at 
time t, then 
#-pk(t) = - 'YkPk(t) + I q(klk',t»)'k'Pko(t) , 
at k' 
where the Inmal conruuons are gIven by 
If AJk(t) IS the transition rate from state k to 
state J, then the net transitIon rate out of 
state k IS 
~= I Ajk(t) 
J 
and the quantity 
q(klk',t) = 4x{t) 
)'k' 
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is the condlUonal probability of amval In 
state k, gIven a transinon out of state k' at t. 
In a Markov process the self-transItion 
rates Akk varush. However SInce effective 
Monte Carlo samplIng requITes the values of 
'Yk appeanng In the Markov equation to be 
independent of time, we treat 
nonhomogeneous Markov processes by 
forCIng the transltlon rates )'k to have 
poslUve value that are Independent of nme 
TIns IS accomplished by defmmg a ficntious 
self-transItion rate 
4k(t) = ~ -L Ajk(t), 
}*k 
where 'Yk is taken to be sufficiently large 
that Akk(t) will remain nonnegative. In 
cases where the transition rates either 
remain constant or increase with time thIS 
may be achIeved by letting 
where T IS the InlSSlOn time. 
2.1. Analog Monte Carlo 
Analog Monte Carlo tnals are 
performed as indicated in Figure 1. The 
times to the succeSSIve transnions are 
deternuned by setting the cumulative 
distrIbunon fUh.::tion 
F( tit' ,k') = 1 -e-1& (t-n 
equal to a uruformly dIstnbuted random 
number 1; and solvmg for t, 
Yes 
~Scxtlnlll 
FIgure 1: Monte Carlo Tnal Procedure for a 
DesIgn LIfe T 
The new system state IS determined by 
generatmg a second umformly dlstnbuted 
random number ~ and choosmg the state 
for which 
ThIS procedure IS repeated unul the nussion 
tIme IS exceeded or the system reaches an 
absorbmg (i.e., failed) state. At any given 
tIme the unreliability IS Just the fractIon of 
trials that have reached faIled st::l.tes. 
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2.2. Forced Transitions 
In highly reliable systems the foregomg 
algorithm will in most cases require only one 
sampling per hIStOry since the fIrst state 
transitIon is not likely to occur until t > T. 
ThIS also means that only a very small 
fraction of the histones will contribute to the 
tally. and as a result the variance in the 
result will tend to be large. To CIrcumvent 
thIS dIfficulty we may modlfy the distrIbuuon 
of the time to the next transitIon to force 
addItional tranSItions wIthin the time 
mterval 0 < t < T while modIfymg the tally 
such that the results are unbiased. The 
modified cumulative dIstribuuon IS 
F(tlt' ok') = 1 - e-'Yt{t - t') 
1 - e-1k{T - t') t' < t<T 
With the uniformly dIstnbuted random 
number ~ , the time of the next tranSlUon IS 
then determined from 
t = t' - i, 1n{ 1 -~ 1 - e-)'k'(T - n]) . 
To obtain an unbiased result a weight Wi is 
attached to each trial and initialized at Wi = 
1. Each time that forced transiuon sampling 
is performed the weight 15 modIfied by 
WI -+ wI 1 -e-'Yk(T - 0] . 
The tally for the unreliabilIty IS then 
With a sampling variance given by 
2.3. Failure Biasing 
Forced transltlons assure that faults 
WIll occur in a substantial fractlon of the 
~onte Carlo mals. However In some 
SItuauons the samplIng may remam poor. In 
mechanIcal systems, for example, repaIr 
rates typIcally are orders of magnItude 
larger than component failure rates. 
Llkewlse. In aVIOnIC systems electroruc fault 
handlIng systems result In state tranSItlon 
rates that are much faster than the rates at 
which faIlures are Induced mto the system 
To funher enhance the effecoveness of the 
~10nte Carlo SImulatIon the fractlon of 
smaller probablhty faIlure translOons may be 
Increased by the use of a second VarIance 
reductIon techmque WhICh we refer to as 
failure bIasmg 
In faIlure biasIng the transmon 
probabIlIoes q(klk') are mo(iIfied to mcrease 
the ratIo of failures to other events such as 
successful fault handlings. We first divIde 
the transitIons out of state k' mto to sets; A 
Includes those resulting from component 
faIlures and R those resultIng from 
successful repair or fault handlIng. We may 
then \J,.nte 
)k = 2: AJt(t) + 2: JlJk . 
JeAk - JE Rk 
We require that some fraction x of the 
tranSItions come from the set L. The biased 
transluon probabilioes are then 
q(klk') = q(klk') x , 
L q(k"lk') keA, 
t"eA 
and 
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q(klk') = q(klk') (1 - x), 
2, q(k"lk') 
keR. 
k"eR 
To maintaIn unbIased results the trIal 
weIght is modified by 
WI -) WI} 2, q(k"lk') 
t"eA 
for component faIlures and 
WI -) WI (l! ) I q(k"lk') 
x k"eR 
for repaIr. In USIng faIlure bIaSIng we 
typIcally choose x to be between 0.5 and 0.6; 
studies of model problems have Indicated 
that values as high as 0.75 may be used 
before one begins to observe the increases 
In the sample VarIance that anse from 
improbable but very hIgh weight histones 
(Kirsch, 1988). 
3. APPLICATIONS 
Two classes of problems are conSIdered 
in order to examme the accuracy and 
effiCIency of Monte Carlo methods The first 
conSIsts of simple hybnd redundant systems 
for whIch we have also obtained analytical 
solutions. By varying the ratio of failure to 
fault handling rate the ability of the vanance 
reduction methods to provide accurate 
simulations can be determined for systems 
With very small faIlure probabilines. In the 
second class of problems are included two 
benchmark confIgurations for which 
compuung omes and detenmnIsuc soluoons 
have been obtained using the NASA Hybnd 
Automated ReliabIlity Predictor (HARP) 
(Bavuso, et al., 1987a, 1987b). 
BehaVIoral composition is employed m 
the HARP code to separate fault/error-
handling models from the fault occurrence 
models. The code mcludes the capabllIty for 
treaung a vanety of error handlmg models, 
whtle fault occurrence IS modeled as an 
nonhomogeneous contInuous-nme Markov 
process. The Imperfect coverage fault/error 
handling models are reduced to a set of 
transltIon probabIlities, allOWing the enure 
system to be treated wIth nonhomogeneous 
Markov equations m WhICh only the longer 
tIme constants of fault occurrence appear. 
The HARP code solves the Markov 
equauons by the Runge-Kutta method. 
3.1. H)'brid ~1odel Problem 
We consIder a SImple hybnd (LeWIS 
and Tu, 1986; Bavuso, et aI., 1987) system 
for whIch we have obtained analytIcal 
solutlons elsewhere (Kirsch, 1988). It 
consists of three umts In a majonty vote 
configuratIOn with one spare. Each of the 
unIts Including the spare has a constant 
faIlure rate I, where It is assumed that the 
spare can not fall unul It IS switched m. 
Coverage of the fault by swltchmg in the 
spare takes place with a constant rate u. 
The ten hour mISSIon system faIlure 
probabuuy IS shown m Table lover a large 
range of parameters, WIth A and l) gIven m 
hrs-l. The ablhty of Monte Carlo simulatIon 
WIth vartance reductIon to provide accurate 
estImates of very small failure probabilities 
IS clearly illustrated. 
1. 
~o 
Table 1. Model Problem Comparison of 
AnalytIcal and Monte Carlo Unreliability 
WlthN=IQOO 
,.aa Uonlt-CarlO COo' "lallY, 1)1). solullOll IOUbft error 
-2 ~ 0 S b2464 10. 2 -2 02507 10 00182 o 01745 
-l ~O ~ O· P29tt ., -5 10 03073 10 o 01' 2. o 02471 
-4 ~ 0 7 -, -, ~O P 3592 10 03667 10 o ~762' 002018 
~ 0- s ~ 0' P 5997 -I _'' 10 09136 10 o n62 o 01545 
-s ~ 0 t -, -Il ~O P 6291 10 06371 10 00147 o 01143 
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3.2. Three·Processor Two.Memory 
One-Buss System 
The detailed problem speCIfication for 
the 3-processor, 2-memory I-buss system is 
given elsewhere (Bavuso, et aI., 1987). 
Briefly, the system is modeled by the 
Markov diagram shown in FIgure 2, where 
A. l) and a represent the processor, memory 
and buss failure rates. The three numbers 
associated WIth each Markov state are the 
number of operational processors, memory 
units and buses, respectIvely, and Fl 
through F3 are states of system failure. Not 
shown are the direct translUons from each of 
the states to system failure that result from 
near-comcidence and single point failures. 
The relanve frequenCIes of such failures are 
determined from the AIRES fault/error 
handhng model (Bavuso, et a1.. 1987) and 
appear in the Markov equations as 
modifications of the state transition 
probabilities. 
Figure 2: Markov Representation of the 3-
Processor, 2-Memory, I-Buss System 
Figure 3 shows Monte Carlo results for 
the system unreliability over a mISSIon nme 
of ten hours. The data. gIven in Bavuso, et 
al.. 1987. is for time-mdependent fault 
occurrence rates. The three lines 
correspond to the point estimate and the 
68% confidence interval. The Monte Carlo 
results shown In Fig 4 are for the same 
system, but with Weibull distnbutions for 
fault occurrence rates; these have modult of 
m = 2.5 In both cases the Monte Carlo 
simulauons conSIsted of 10,000 mals. 
'Ir-----------------------------_ 
, .. 
I' 
I.~----------------------------~ II " I. , ••• ~ ••• " .1 I .... 
nl( ~ 
FIgure 3. Unreliability vs. TlIDe for the 3-
Processor, 2-Memory, I-Buss System WIth 
Constant Failure Rates 
•• r-----------------------------~ 
It. 
.. ~----~~------------------------~ I. ,. I. I ••• S ••• ' ••• I .... 
fPC HISI 
FIgure 4: Unreliabihty vs. Time for the 3-
Processor, 2-Memory, I-Bass System wlth 
Incres10g Failure Rates 
Table 2 indicates that the results 
from the Monte Carlo and HARP 
calculauons are 10 excellent agreement; all 
CPU times are on a VAX 11n85. The 
Monte Carlo sImulatlons also provide 
reasonable estlmates of the smaller 
probabIhues correspondmg to partIcular 
faIlure modes As an extreme example, the 
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near-coincidence failure probability gwen as 
2.79 10- 11 by HARP IS esnmated as 127 (± 
1.26) 10- 11 . Smce this few-component 
problem can be reduced to a set of only six 
nonabsorbmg Markov states, It IS not 
surprising that the Monte Carlo SImulations 
are longer runnmg. It is instrucuve to note, 
however. that even for small problems the 
running times are comparable when Wei bull 
distnbutIons are employed.. 
Table 2: Ten Hour Mission Unreltability for a 
3-Processor 2-Memory I-Buss System 
ConSlanl Failure Rates Monte Carlo HARP 
Unrehabwty 1.498 (±{).034)I0-4 1.521 10-4 
mrsec. 56 
Weibull Fa1lures Monte Carlo HARP 
Unrehabwty 4.789(±{).IS8) 10-3 4.783 10-3 
582 796 
3.3. Jet Engine Control System 
The jet engine controller problem, 
speCIfied in detail elsewhere (Bavuso, et al., 
1987), provIdes a basis for comparIng the 
Monte Carlo and HARP codes for a system 
wnh a larger number of components. The 
CARE II model (Bavuso, et al., 1987) is 
used for error/fault-handling. The 20 
component system has 171 nnmmum cut 
sets and IS rughly redundant as mdIcated by 
the fault tree representation shown in 
Figure 5. The Monte Carlo results for a 10 
hour mIssion are shown in FIgure 6 The 
Monte Carlo unreliability estimate of 1.073 
(±0.087) 10-5 compares well with the 
HARP result of 1 112 10 -5. 
Figure S: Fault Tree Representation of the 
Jet Engine Control System 
-" 
, d--' 
, , ~----- -- ---- --
tJ 'I II I •• 1 " " II 
• C .-so 
It 11 , • 
Figure 6: Unreliability vs. Tune for the Jet 
Engine Control System 
The time advantages of Monte Carlo 
simulation become apparent for problems 
with many Markov states. While the 10,CXXl 
history simulation from which the above 
results were obtained required 20 minutes 
on the VAX Iln8S the time that would be 
requrred by HARP on the same machine is 
estimated to be of the order of 10 hours. To 
examine the effect of time-dependent failure 
rates on the Monte Carlo simulation times 
the power supply failure rates in the jet 
engine control were replaced WIth WeI bull 
distributions wIth modulus two (Kelkhoff. 
1989). This results in less than a 50% 
Increase in the computing time needed to 
obtain comparable confidence intervals on 
the unreliability. The Monte Carlo model 
has also been generalized to allow 
nonMarkovlan as-good-as-new parts 
replacement on the power supply 
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components. Socb modeling increased the 
computing time by roughly a factor of three 
over the constant failure rate model but 
allows problems to be simulated by Monte 
Carlo that cannot be treated with HARP. 
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